Regulatory and Supervisory Independence: Is There a Case for Independent Monetary Authorities in Brazil by Anderson, John William, Jr.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 10 | Number 2 Article 2
2004
Regulatory and Supervisory Independence: Is
There a Case for Independent Monetary
Authorities in Brazil
John William Anderson Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John William Anderson Jr., Regulatory and Supervisory Independence: Is There a Case for Independent Monetary Authorities in Brazil, 10
Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 253 (2004)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol10/iss2/2
REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY
INDEPENDENCE: Is THERE A CASE
FOR INDEPENDENT MONETARY
AUTHORITIES IN BRAZIL?
John William Anderson, Jr.*'
"I wish to assert a much more fundamental role for institutions in soci-




ESPITE its importance, the issue of financial sector regulatory
and supervisory independence ("RSI") has received only margi-
nal attention in literature and practice. The present work at-
tempts to fill this gap by revisiting the theoretical approach justifying RSI
and by conducting a case study on the Brazilian institutional framework.
The object of this paper assumes greater relevance in light of the cur-
rent political and economic perspectives in Brazil. In May 2003, an
amendment to article 192 of Brazil's Federal Constitution of 1988 regulat-
ing the Brazilian Financial System was approved by the Brazilian Con-
gress.2 With the approval of this amendment, considerable changes are
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expected in the regulation of Brazil's financial system. Prior to being
amended, the original constitutional provision established that the Brazil-
ian Financial System, including banking, securities, insurance and re-in-
surance sectors, would be regulated by a single complementary law,
which required a qualified quorum or an absolute majority of each of
Brazil's legislative houses for approval. The constitutional amendment
now allows the financial system to be regulated by more than one com-
plementary law. Considering the complexity of issues in regulating the
financial system, this amendment allows for more rapid legislative pro-
duction on the subject. Thus, debates in connection with the effectiveness
and soundness of the current regulatory and supervisory framework of
Brazilian monetary authorities have regained importance.
In addition, it is uncertain how monetary policy and banking supervi-
sion in Brazil will be conducted within the administration of President
Lufs Inicio Lula da Silva. Certain challenges face the Brazilian monetary
authorities in attempting to achieve monetary stability after the country's
recent financial crisis in 1998 and 1999. These challenges include the re-
duction of inflation, the pursuit of economic growth, the control of cur-
rency value within the generalized global financial meltdown, and the
guarantee of sound banking regulation and supervision. RSI can play an
important role in the pursuit of such goals.
In the first part of this article, the theoretical background of RSI will be
revisited and analyzed. Section one limits the scope of this work and es-
tablishes the different aspects of banking regulation and supervision.
Section two addresses the main theoretical justifications for institutional
RSI i.e., regulatory capture, time inconsistency, and the relationship be-
tween institutions and economic growth. Section three outlines the insti-
tutional framework of RSI. In the second part of this article, the degree
of the Brazilian monetary authorities' RSI is assessed. Section four de-
scribes the institutional framework of Brazil's financial system, evaluates
the degree of RSI within the Brazilian monetary authorities, and outlines
proposals for improvements, The final part presents concluding remarks.
II. ESTABLISHING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. DEFINING THE SCOPE - BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
1. Banking Regulation and Supervision - Definitions and Rationales
To limit the scope of this work and establish precise definitions of
banking regulation and banking supervision, the boundaries of regulation
and supervision must be set. In the present work, the term "regulation"
should be understood as the normative intervention of the state in the
economic activities of particulars, including the concession of public ser-
vices and the direct regulation of economic activities. Similarly, the term
"supervision" encompasses the activities of the state in connection with
the enforcement of its normative activity. Supervision is often seen as an
ancillary activity of regulation; it is directly related to the oversight of the
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performance of certain activities by particulars and to the compliance of
rules enacted by regulatory bodies.
Establishing definitions and rationales for banking regulation, how-
ever, is a difficult task. As noted by Mathias Dewatripont and Jean
Tirole, "[t]here is no consensus in academe on why banks should be regu-
lated, and whether they should be regulated at all."' 3 As a result, a vast
amount of literature exists on many features of banking regulation, and
consensus is rare.
Though current banking activities exceed the scope of traditional bank-
ing activity4 (deposit-taking and lending),5 most of the rationales for
banking regulation are still based upon the traditional business of banks.
Thus, the proposed definition for "banking regulation" is the set of rules
in the form of legislation enacted by a parliament, administrative rules
enacted by competent governmental authorities, and rules issued by in-
ternational organizations and self-regulatory organizations that discipline
the above-described banking activity and the institutions that perform
such activity. "Banking supervision" refers to the oversight of banking
activity and of the institutions performing such activity, as well as the
enforcement of related rules.
Various rationales for banking regulation and supervision exist, includ-
ing rationales arising from the traditional justifications for regulation,
such as public interest,6 overcoming market deficiencies, 7 and guarantee-
3. MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF
BANKS 29 (1994).
4. See id.; ROSA MARIA LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REGULATION
(1996) (recognizing that banks engage in a variety of other activities, such as the
following: financial service operations not linked to the granting of actual loans,
including the underwriting of securities; future or contingent loans, including the
issue of documentary credits, asset sales with recourse, stand-by letters of credit
and guarantees; and derivatives transactions). This diversification of banking ac-
tivities is the result of an evolution in banking industry and an overall trend to-
wards deregulation mainly triggered by increasing competition posed to banks by
other financial intermediaries.
5. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 81 ("A commercial bank is a financial intermediary
that typically receives deposits and grants loans, and together with these credit
intermediary functions performs other services, such as payment intermediary, as-
set custodianship, investment manager."); see also id. at 76 (stating that these defi-
nitions highlight the classic functions of banks and their major roles in economy
activity: "to fund illiquid loans, which support productive investments, with highly
liquid liabilities, thus transferring liquidity from surplus units (depositors) to defi-
cit units (borrowers)."). DEWATRIPONT & TIROLE, supra note 3, at 13 ("A bank is
a financial intermediary that participates in the payment system and finances enti-
ties in financial deficit (typically the public sector, nonfinancial firms, and some
households) using the funds of entities in financial surplus (typically
households).").
6. See C.S. SALOMAO FILHO, REGULA AO DA ATIVIDADE ECONOMICA - PRINCtPIOS
E FUNDAMENTOS JURfDICOS 15-26 (2001); see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (explaining considerations on public inter-
est and public choice).
7. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 377-401 (5th ed. 1998);
OLIVER WILLIAMSON, Tr ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 18-23 (1987);
Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426,
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ing competition. 8 Also, differing rationales exist for more specific fea-
tures of the banking industry, including prudential, 9 systemic, 10 and
monetary policy concerns. 1
The rationale of the Economic School, which concerns correcting ex-
ternalities of the market or dealing with transaction costs, can be applied
to banking regulation. Charles Goodhart and his co-authors point out
that economies of scale can be secured by regulation and supervision in
the banking industry.' 2 Regulation and supervision are pursued to obtain
an efficient monitoring process of investment contracts and deposits, es-
pecially in determining the values of such contracts and deposits. Rosa
Marfa Lastra also recognizes the existence of information deficiencies as
the main market imperfection that justifies banking regulation. The au-
thor outlines some natural monopoly features in the banking industry, as
well as externalities caused by bank failures.1 3 Information deficiencies
are acute in the banking industry because loans are made on a fixed-
nominal value basis, and "[tihe non-marketability of the asset portfolio
creates uncertainty, making it difficult to assess the creditworthiness of
the banks and to distinguish the riskiness [sic] between strategies.' 14
Guaranteeing competition is also defended as a rationale for banking
regulation. Salomdo FilhoI 5 classifies the banking sector as one of those
sectors in which regulation preserves competition in an environment that
is propitious to undermine competition.' 6 The barriers of entry for new
banks created by the authorization requirements of banking regulation
are an example of factors that undermine competition in the industry.1 7
Likewise, Carlos Baptista Lobo suggests the idea of barriers of entry and
even a potential natural oligopoly in the industry, mainly generated by
the accrued reputation of existing banks.18 Predatory pricing and com-
pulsory negotiations would be possible anti-competitive behaviors in the
industry, facilitated by the high level of concentration in the sector (espe-
cially in recent years due to the failures of medium and small-sized
426-48, reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSACTION COSTS 429 (Oliver E. Wil-
liamson & Scott E. Masten, eds., 1999); R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J. L. & ECON. 1, 1-44 (1960); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regula-
tion, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 548-643 (1969).
8. SALOMAO FILHO, supra note 6, at 13-50.
9. See CHARLES GOODHART ET. AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND
WHERE NOW? 5 (1998); DEWATRIPONT & TIROLE. supra note 3, at 31-32.
10. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 163; GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 9, at 8-9.
11. See Eduardo Salomao Neto, Atividade Privativa de Instituiqao Financeira 22
(1998) (unpublished post-doctorate thesis, University of Sio Paulo) (on file with
the University of Sdo Paulo Library); LASTRA, supra note 4, at 75.
12. GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 9, at 9-10.
13. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 73-74.
14. Id. at 74.
15. SALOMAO FiLHo, supra note 6, at 47.
16. Id. The author makes a counterargument to sectors characterized by natural mo-
nopolies in which competition must be created, rather than preserved.
17. See CAL IXTO SA OMAO FILHO, REGULAIL&O E CONCORREINCIA: ESTUDOS E
PARECERES 31-32 (2002).
18. CARLOS BAPTISTA LOBO, CONCORRIENCIA BANCARIA 155 (2001).
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banks) and the barriers to entry.t9
In addition to the above-mentioned justifications, banking regulation
rationales are also based upon the specific characteristics of the banking
industry and banking activities. Most of the specific justifications for
banking regulation arise from the main banking activities of deposit tak-
ing and lending. Lastra highlights the complexities arising from asset-
liability mismatch as some of the main concerns of banking regulation. 20
The relevant literature differentiates between prudential and systemic
rationales for banking regulation. Prudential regulation refers to "the
safety and soundness of financial institutions vis-d-vis consumer protec-
tion."' 21 Goodhart and his co-authors make a case for prudential regula-
tion because bank consumers would not be "in a position to judge the
safety and soundness of financial institutions" in view of the difficulties of
evaluation arising from the nature of banks' assets and liabilities.22
Dewatripont and Tirole make a similar case for banking (prudential) reg-
ulation by focusing their justifications on the protection of small deposi-
tors, who are unsophisticated and lack the necessary skills to monitor and
evaluate the "intricacies of balance and off-balance sheet activities. "23,24
In addition to consumer protection, systemic concerns are at the core
of banking regulation, as banks in particular are subject to causing and
incurring systemic risk. According to Goodhart and his co-authors,
"banks are subject to runs, which have contagion effects, and which can
throw solvent banks into insolvency both because a large proportion of
their assets are not easily marketable and, probably to a lesser extent,
because the panic drives down the current value of marketable assets."'25
19. SALOMAO FILHO, supra note 17, at 34-36.
20. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 81-82 ("[B]anks suffer a particularly acute maturity
mismatch between short-term liquid liabilities [deposits] and longer term, compar-
atively, illiquid, non-marketable or, at least, non-marketed assets [loans, the mar-
ketability and evaluation of which are complex].").
21. See GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 9, at 5.
22. Id.
23. DEWATRIPONT & TIROLE, supra note 3, at 31-32. Note that the authors advocate a
different regulatory package for sophisticated clients and investors.
24. See GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 9, at 5 (systemizing the case for prudential
regulation to be necessary "where: (1) there is a fiduciary role of the institution;
(2) consumers are unable to judge the safety and soundness of institutions with
which they are dealing; (3) the value of contracts to the consumer is determined by
the subsequent behavior of the institution, and [such institution] may become risk-
ier because of a change in behavior after a long-term contract has been taken out
by customers; and (4) there is a potential claim on a compensation or deposit in-
surance fund"). Banks are prone to have the above-described characteristics.
First, banks assume a fiduciary role upon the management of the financial re-
sources of third parties. Next, the complexity of bank's balance and off-balance
sheet transaction and the evaluation of the assets of banks have already been ad-
dressed. Last, the role of the compensation of deposit insurance mechanisms is
interesting to be observed. As demonstrated below, banks are usually offered pro-
tection mechanisms for failures to protect depositors and to avoid systemic risk.
These mechanisms are apt to create a moral hazard scenario, which may encourage
banks to engage in riskier activities.
25. Id. at 8-9. A bank's assets are mainly loans and are evaluated on the basis of
information that the bank holds. In the instance of information deficiency, a see-
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For these authors, "[s]ystemic regulation is necessary when the social
costs of the failure of a financial institution (particularly a bank) exceed
the private cost and such potential social costs are not incorporated in the
decision making of the firm."'26 Lastra points to the systemic aspect as
the main justification for banking regulation. Although acknowledging
that "the safety and soundness of the financial system" and "the eco-
nomic neutrality in the allocation of credit" are important justifications
for regulation, its "ultimate goal is to safeguard confidence in the banking
system. "27
Again, the specific features of banking activities draw the scenario for
systemic concerns. First, banks are subject to bank runs. Lastra reasons
that banks runs are caused "because of the relative illiquidity of loans-
they cannot be sold quickly without a loss in value-and because deposits
can be withdrawn on demand or on short notice."' 28 Upon a lack of confi-
dence in the financial system, the first-come, first-serve nature of bank
deposits creates the incentive for a bank run. And because banks are
prone to runs, maintaining public confidence in the banking system is cru-
cial to banking regulation. Moreover, there is a risk of contagion in the
banking system, and the collapse (illiquidity and insolvency) of one insti-
tution may cause the collapse of others, especially if doubts exist as to the
soundness of a given financial system.
In the worst-case scenario, contagion and a lack of confidence in the
financial system may generate a banking crisis. According to Mojmir
Mrak, a banking crisis occurs "when actual or potential pressure on banks
and/or their incapability of regular renewal of financial sources results in
either their inability to meet their obligations or state intervention in
form of financial help to the banks."'29 Note that financial help would be
given to banks with the aim of preventing their illiquidity or possible in-
solvency. The Slovenian author highlights that a banking crisis that in-
volves a high number of banks has the potential of evolving into a crisis
for the whole financial sector, including the securities markets. 30
The systemic concerns of the banking system also have an international
dimension. In the past few decades, the world witnessed the phenome-
non of financial globalization, 31 in which financial markets grew interna-
tionally and "financial innovation and new technologies have eroded
geographic barriers. '32 Several authors have considered the effects of
ondary market for loans will not benefit from this information, and the value of
these assets will be lower during a bank's liquidation.
26. Id. at 8.
27. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 71.
28. Id. at 82.
29. MOJMIR MRAK, MEDNARODNE FINANCE 574 (2002).
30. Id.
31. Globalization is generally described as a process of integrating countries, catalyzed
by developments in technology such as improvements in communication and the
sharing of information among nations. This results in an increased flow in trade,
capital, technology, people, and ideas across national boundaries.
32. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 163.
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globalization on the international financial system, and many present a
critical view, especially with respect to developing countries. 3 3
The growing interdependence of financial markets and the consequent
contagion risk of banking and financial crises creates the need for inter-
national coordination of banking regulatory and supervisory activities.
The prudential regulation standards developed by the Basel Committee
of Banking Supervision are an example of a response to such needs.
Finally, some authors identify concerns with monetary policy as a justi-
fication for banking regulation. Lastra highlights the special function of
demand deposits as a major component of the money supply.34 Eduardo
Salom~o Neto reaffirms the money-multiplying factor arising from finan-
cial intermediation (deposit taking and lending) as the main justification
for banking regulation. 35
2. A General Scheme of Banking Regulation and Supervision
In light of these rationales, banking regulation generally addresses: (1)
authorization and licensing requirements; (2) capital adequacy require-
ments; (3) lending activity - terms, conditions and limitations; (4) deposit
activity - terms, conditions and limitations; (5) off-sheet balance sheet
activities, including securities underwriting, securitization, derivative
transactions, stand-by guarantees, and foreign exchange activities; (6) illi-
quidity, insolvency and related liquidation and intervention procedures;
and (7) deposit insurance, financial assistance, and other protection
schemes.36
In addition, a general scheme of banking supervision would include "li-
censing [(referring to authorization and capital adequacy requirements)],
supervision strictu sensu [(also referred to as prudential supervision)], and
sanctioning and crisis management," which includes intervention, bank-
ruptcy, and insolvency procedures, as well as deposit insurance schemes
and monetary authorities' role as lender of last resort.37
The specific needs of banking regulation, namely prudential and sys-
temic concerns, are addressed in those regulation and supervision
schemes. Licensing and authorization, as well as capital adequacy re-
quirements, guarantee that financial institutions have sufficient capitali-
zation and acceptable standards of risk management in order to endeavor
33. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Ross
BUCKLEY, International Capital Flows, Economic Sovereignty and Developing
Countries, 4 Y.B. INT'L FIN. & ECON. L. 17, 17-19 (1999).
34. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 75.
35. Salomdo Neto, supra note 11, at 22.
36. It is not our intention to design an exhaustive scheme of banking regulation.
Banking regulation, broadly defined, would also include provisions with respect to
disclosure, money laundry, corporate governance, and other particularities of the
industry. The purpose here is to address banking regulation upon the justifications
established and to limit the scope of the present work for purposes of studying
regulatory and supervisory independence of monetary authorities.
37. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 108-44 (serving as the design model for banking
supervision).
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deposit taking and lending activities. The stability of such institutions
(systemic concerns) and the consequent consumer protection (prudential
concerns) is clearly aimed.
Similarly, provisions addressing insolvency, bankruptcy, and interven-
tion procedures purport to protect consumers and safeguard the stability
of the financial system as a whole. Due to the complex valuation of bank
assets and the going concern value that such assets exceed their liquida-
tion value, banks are subject to intervention and differentiated liquida-
tion procedures. Among other goals, such procedures are designed to
maintain the value of bank assets during liquidation or insolvency proce-
dures and possibly to sanitize unhealthy portfolios, thus avoiding bank
runs and contagion. Finally, deposit insurance mechanisms, the lender of
last resort for monetary authorities, and other bailout mechanisms, such
as crisis management, address systemic concerns.
According to Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller, a regulatory design is com-
posed of regulatory governance and regulatory incentives. 38 The authors
define regulatory governance as "the mechanisms that societies use to
constrain regulatory discretion and to resolve conflicts that arise in rela-
tion to these constraints. ' 39 Regulatory incentives refer to the material
aspect of regulation. This paper concentrates on a particular aspect of
regulatory governance, i.e., the case for regulatory and supervisory inde-
pendence of monetary authorities.
B. THE CASE FOR REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY
INDEPENDENCE ("RSI")
1. Introduction
One of the important debates concerning regulatory governance refers
to the independence 40 of the regulatory and supervisory bodies, or, as
described by the applicable administrative law literature, administrative
decentralization. 41 The debate was largely influenced by the institutional
model of independent regulatory commissions of the United States,
which in turn has influenced regulatory designs all over the world.42
38. Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Com-
mitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 201, 205 (1994), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSACTION
COSTS, supra note 7, at 463-64.
39. Id. at 205.
40. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 10. For purposes of describing central bank indepen-
dence, the author defines independence as follows: "Independence indicates the
absence of political interference and implies the widest possible room for manoeu-
vre in the conduct of the policies [or competences] delegated to the central bank."
41. See Sebastido Botto de Barros Tojal, Pan American Health Organization, 0 Con-
trole Judicial Da Atividade Normativa Das Agencias Reguladoras (2003), available
at http://www.paho.org/Spanish/HDP/hddl2BottodeBarros.pdf.
42. See id. at 6, 9-10. The U.S. model has three distinctive phases. The first wave of
regulation occurred in the end of the nineteenth century and in the beginning of
the twentieth century and was mainly focused on the antitrust agencies, which
were created to deal with problems caused by natural monopolies. The second
wave, contemporaneous to the "New Deal," was characterized by the creation of
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As outlined by Steven Ramirez, the general policy arguments for inde-
pendent agencies are guarantees of: (1) professionalism and expertise in
connection with regulatory policy; (2) a stable and consistent basis for
regulatory continuity; (3) constant regulatory adaptation to changing con-
ditions; and (4) the elimination of political influence of special interests. 4 3
The creation of independent agencies or commissions has generated de-
bates on their political and legal legitimacy within a democratic regime.
For example, legislative delegation to independent agencies challenges
the traditional concept of separation of powers and poses the question of
how a governmental body that was not elected through traditional
processes is able to enact rules. The same debate exists in connection
with the enforcement and adjudicative powers of such agencies. Despite
these debates, however, there is a consensus in literature and in different
jurisdictions about the legitimacy of such independent agencies, provided
that adequate mechanisms are in place to guarantee the accountability of
such agencies and control their actions by executive, legislative or judici-
ary branches. 44
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Congress may dele-
gate legislative powers without offending the constitutional requirement
that Congress hold the legislative power of the federal government, as
long as it provides intelligible principles to guide any agency in exercising
delegated power. In addition, the U.S. Constitution limits the structural
independence of such administrative agencies and provides that the Presi-
dent may remove officers of agencies upon a showing of good cause, pur-
suant to court interpretations. Finally, many of the acts of independent
agencies and their budgets are subject to the control of Congress, and the
judiciary may also review agency decisions.45
Similarly, Brazilian independent agencies, 46 created within the Plano
Diretor de Reforma do Aparelho do Estado (Brasilia, 1995) and by the
independent agencies in several sectors with legislative, adjudicative, and execu-
tive functions. The third wave can be placed after the eighties within the deregula-
tion environment of that country. The Brazilian regulatory model has a clear
inspiration in such regulatory evolution.
43. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
503, 569 (2000).
44. See Tojal, supra note 41; see also Paulo Todescan Lessa Mattos, Agincias regu-
ladoras e democracia: participagdo pfiblica e desenvolvimento, in REcI ii ACO E
DESENVOLVIMENTO 182-230 (Calixto Salomdo Filho ed., 2002).
45. See Ramirez, supra note 43, at 513-16, 525-26 (describing the U.S. accountability
mechanisms and legitimacy debate).
46. The independent agencies are a legal figure entitled autarquias-"[a]n autono-
mous service, created by law, with legal personality and own financial resources,
that perform activities of the public administration that require, for a better result,
a decentralized administrative and financial management." Decree-Law No. 200
of Feb. 25, 1997 [Decreto-Lei No. 200 de 25 de Fevereiro de 1997] (Braz.). In other
words, autarquias are legal figures of the Brazilian legal system (legal entities
under a public law regime) that allow decentralized administration of certain sec-
tors. They are characterized by having autonomy in managing their financial re-
sources and are controlled but not subordinated to the Central Administration.
See C.A.B. MELLO, CURSO DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 145-68 (15th ed. 2003),
for a thorough analysis.
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process of privatization of several economic sectors, 47 have been subject
to similar critics. Professor E. Grau clearly expressed his opinion towards
the unconstitutionality of such independent agencies, noting that these
regulatory bodies are characterized by: (1) the absence of hierarchic sub-
ordination; (2) independence or autonomy in the administrative, finan-
cial, patrimonial, technical, and human resources management fields; and
(3) a fixed mandate and stability of its officers. 48 The latter characteristic
is incompatible with the constitutional regime of the autarquias: the of-
ficers, by definition, are subject to discretionary presidential control for
appointment and dismissal purposes.49
On the other hand, acknowledging the shift in legal paradigms with the
advent of the so -called "regulatory law" arising from the changes in the
behavior and role of the state during the past centuries, Tojal defends the
legitimacy and constitutionality of Brazilian independent agencies upon a
broader control of the normative activity by the judiciary power. 50
Adopting a different approach, Paulo Mattos defends the legitimacy and
constitutionality of the agencies upon the existence and successful imple-
mentation of instruments of public participation in the decision-making
process of these bodies, such as public consultations, public meetings, and
formal accusations by the public and interested parties. 51
In sum, RSI has been widely accepted within the new paradigm of reg-
ulatory law, provided that adequate control and accountability mecha-
nisms are put in place. In the next section, two main theoretical streams
that support RSI in the banking sector will be addressed.
2. The Capture Problem
The concept of capture is part of the deregulation trend in economic
literature and arises as one of the main criticisms against regulation. In a
seminal work, George Stigler suggests that "as a rule, regulation is ac-
quired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its ben-
efit."-52 Rather than pursing public interest, economists argue that
regulated industries would be able to drive regulation towards its special
interests. Stigler develops the capture problem upon the analysis of the
legislative machinery and the costs involved in the legislative process,
such as "votes and resources. '53 The author concludes that certain indus-
tries sufficient in size to bear such costs would succeed in having their
interests contemplated by regulation.
47. See Law No. 8,031 of Apr. 10, 1990 [Lei No. 8,031 de 10 de abril de 1990 (Braz.).
48. E. Grau, As agencias, essas reparti Oes ptiblicas, in REGULACAO E DESENVOLVI-
MENTO 25-28 (Calixto Salomao Filho ed., 2002).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 16-23.
51. Mattos, supra note 44, at 182-230.
52. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 3, 3 (1971).
53. Id. at 12.
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In light of its characteristics, the banking industry is considered prone
to capture problems. Ramirez asserts that bank regulation "naturally is
more inclined to succumb to these influences because these are 'money'
industries. ' 54 Writing about central bank independence in the context of
conducting monetary policy, Alan Blinder highlights the risk that central
banks may follow the interest of the market rather than pursue adequate
policies.55
Professor Jeffrey Worsham concluded that organized interests can
"reign supreme" in the banking industry in light of the following rea-
sons.56 Banks can benefit disproportionately because regulation can "de-
liver concentrated benefits in exchange for diffuse or deferred costs."' 57 In
turn, banking regulation generally does not attract the attention of the
general public, which facilitates the capture by specific interests (the au-
thor makes an exception for financial crises scenarios, and acknowledges
that this capture factor may be transitorily annulled). 58 Ramirez uses em-
pirical evidence to justify his assertions by explaining that the U.S. sav-
ings and loan crisis of the 1980s-the costs of which amounted to one
trillion U.S. dollars-was caused by "political distortions of regulatory
policy" that had "their origins in severe failures by Congress as well as
the primary thrift regulator, the FHLBB [Federal Home Loan Bank
Board], to resist the political influence of the savings and loan
industry."59
Liliana Rojas-Suarez recognizes that regulatory capture problems oc-
curred in the banking crisis in Ecuador in 1996 (though officially declared
in 1998), in which "many areas of policymaking became subordinated to
the situation in the banking system."' 60 Financial conglomerates with con-
siderable political power "prevented the strict application of any sound
restructuring program," and the lack of independence of the local Central
Bank to declare the failure of an institution "subordinated its monetary
policy to the liquidity needs of banks."'61 The author states that regula-
tory capture was "the main constraint that prevented an appropriate res-
54. Ramirez, supra note 43, at 555.
55. ALAN S. BLINDER, CENTRAL BANKING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE § 2.3, 59-62
(1999).
56. See Ramirez, supra note 43, at 556, citing JEFFREY WORSHAM, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY: POLICY CHANGE, CONGRESS AND BANK REGULATION 83 (1997).
57. Id. at 557. The author exemplifies his statement upon the costs of relaxing banking
soundness regulation, which are deferred and diffused. Bank profits are highly
benefited by such relaxation.
58. Id. at 557-59.
59. Id. at 565-66. The FHLBB adopted new accounting standards called "Regulatory
Accounting Principles." According to Ramirez, "[tihis accounting approach al-
lowed losses to be transformed into assets by allowing thrifts to spread certain
losses over a period of up to forty years," and "[t]his masked the worsening finan-
cial condition of the industry and allowed institutions that should have been shut
down to remain in business." Id. at 568.
60. Liliana Rojas-Suarez, Latin American Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee,
Banking Crises in Latin America: Can Recurrence be Prevented?, at 28 (Mar. 2002),
available at http://www.claaf.org/Liliana-banking.doc.
61. Id.
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olution of the 1996 crisis. ' '62
The above authors agree that banks have a considerable degree of in-
fluence over bank regulators. This influence is caused by the high con-
centration of the industry, the availability of resources to bear the costs of
regulatory capture, and the public interests derived from the main ratio-
nales for banking regulation, namely prudential and systemic concerns.
Upon the creation of favorable bailout, deposit insurance mechanisms,
and relaxed capital adequacy requirements, regulators and supervisors
will tend to observe the interests of the banking industry because the fail-
ure and insolvency of banks is likely to cause severe harms to the public
interest and, ultimately, result in a banking crisis situation. It is widely
accepted that highly profitable banks are unlikely to fail unless extremely
risky and careless behavior is encouraged.63
Thus, it is here advocated that regulators and supervisors should be
insulated from the industry's capture, and the rationales of banking regu-
lation and supervision should not be traded for the special interests of
banks. As a result of broad delegation of authority to a singular agency
with a high degree of independence, RSI is pointed to as an institutional
solution for concealing the capture problem.
3. Time Inconsistency, Central Bank Independence, and Monetary and
Financial Stability
This section addresses the protection of RSI from undue political or
governmental influence. In particular, this section develops the argument
laid out by Marc Quintyn and Michael Taylor that "RSI is important for
financial stability for the same reasons that central bank independence is
important for monetary stability."'64
There is a great consensus in existing economic, legal, and political
literature towards central bank independence ("CBI"). 65 In a famous
lecture, Blinder presented an interesting definition of CBI stating, "To
me, central bank independence means two things: first, that the central
bank has freedom to decide how to pursue its goals and, second, that its
decisions are very hard for any other branch of government to reverse. '66
62. Id.
63. The existence of deposit insurance mechanisms, for example, as a regulatory mech-
anism to prevent systemic risks and failures, is considered by vast literature to
create a moral hazard scenario and therefore encourage riskier bank behavior and
consequently, the possibility of higher profits.
64. MARC QUINTYN & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY INDE-
PENDENCE AND FINANCIAL STABILITY (International Monetary Fund, Working Pa-
per No. WP/02/46, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftwp/2002/
wp0246.pdf.
65. See id; BLINDER, supra note 55, at 53-76; LASTRA, supra note 4, at 10-69; INDEPEN-
DENT CENTRAL BANKS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger
ed., 1997); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Indepen-
dence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 433-53 (1998); CHARLES GOODHART, CENTRAL
BANK INDEPENDENCE (London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group,
Special Paper No. 57, 1993), available at http://fmg.lse.ac.uk/pdfs/sp0057.pdf.
66. BLINDER, supra note 55, at 54.
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CBI is advocated mainly in monetary policy conduct, such as the pursuit
of anti-inflationary policies by central banks and monetary authorities.
The basic underlying justification for CBI is that politicians may often be
heavily tempted to use monetary expansions to meet the financial needs
of a given country inconsideration of the short-term benefits, which tend
to be more popular with electors.67 In contrast, independent central
bankers would consider long-term goals and seek the maintenance of
price stability.
Conclusions about the benefits of CBI are grounded upon extensive
economic literature. Goodhart identifies the origin of such reasoning in
the Phillip's curve, which was developed by Bill Phillips, and points out
the criticisms made by Milton Friedman to Phillips's findings.68
Initially, Philips indicated that "an optimal combination, or trade-off,
between inflation and unemployment" could be reached by governments
or monetary authorities.69 In response, Friedman concluded there is no
trade-off in the medium and longer terms between "inflation on the one
hand, and output, growth and unemployment on the other. ' 70 After un-
successful attempts by governments to reach an acceptable trade-off be-
tween inflation and unemployment, it became clear that politicians would
be tempted to achieve more popular short-time goals rather than commit-
ting themselves to a long-term low inflation target. Those conclusions
were systemized in economic literature as the "time inconsistency" prob-
lem, which was developed by Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott in
1977.71 Inconsistency arises when the best plan made for a future period
is no longer optimal at the time that period actually starts. Policy-makers
elaborate policies pursuant to the current conditions, and such policies
may not be optimal in the long run.
In 1983, R.J. Barro and D.B. Gordon developed this argument in con-
nection with monetary policy and price stability.72 The authors pointed
out that monetary authorities in a discretionary regime create inflation
shocks ex-post, and people tend to adjust their expectations to such infla-
tionary surprises. The potential for creating such ex-post inflation shocks
generate higher average rates of inflation and monetary growth, as well
as higher inflation costs. Barro and Gordon concluded the best solution
for the time inconsistency problem is to introduce fixed rules in monetary
policy rather than leaving the task to the discretion of political authori-
ties. If a good enforceability mechanism is in place, either by a superior
67. See id. at 53-76.
68. GOODHART, supra note 65, at 2.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 14; Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather
than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POLITICAL ECON. 473,
473-91 (1977), reprinted in INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANKS AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE, supra note 64.
72. R.J. Barro & D.B. Gordon, Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Mone-
tary Policy, 12 J. OF MONETARY ECON. 101-21 (1983), reprinted in INDEPENDENT
CENTRAL BANKS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 64.
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authority or by a reputation threat, monetary authorities will forgo "the
short-term benefits from inflation shocks in order to secure the gain from
low average inflation over the long-term. '73
Once rules determining price stability are preferable rather than discre-
tion, handing authority over to an independent central bank is a way to
formulate "a credible and binding commitment to price stability. ' 74 It is
important to note the consensus in the literature concerning price stabil-
ity and lower inflation rates as a value and a goal that must be pursued by
monetary authorities.
Similarly, RSI has been advocated as a complementary feature of CBI,
as it purports to guarantee financial stability, which is a twin goal of mon-
etary stability.75 In this regard, Lastra argues that "independence to pur-
sue stable money should be accompanied by independence to pursue
sound banking (... ), because a sound banking system is a necessary con-
dition for maintaining monetary stability. '76
Financial stability is strongly pursued in light of the financial sector cri-
ses of the 1990s, wherein the lack of independence of monetary authori-
ties from political influence was blamed for deepening such crises.
Quintyn and Taylor acknowledge that the experiences of certain coun-
tries demonstrate how inadequate arrangements to ensure the indepen-
dence of the regulatory agencies contributed to financial instability and
banking crises.77
Young Shim recognizes the problems caused by the lack of indepen-
dence ("government controlled banking system with lax regulation and
supervision") of the financial authorities in Korea as one of the main
causes of the Korean banking crisis.78 Quintyn and Taylor also highlight
the case of Japan, where "the lack of independence of the financial super-
vision function within the ministry of finance is also widely believed to
have contributed to the emergence of financial sector weaknesses. '79
The same observations are made with respect to Indonesia where "intru-
sive interventions into the activities of the Indonesian Bank Restructur-
ing Agency (IBRA)" were made by the Financial Sector Action
Committee in connection with the Venezuelan banking crisis of 1994.80
According to the authors, "[p]rotection of weak regulations by politi-
cians and forbearance as a result of political pressures (preventing the
regulators from taking action against institutions that they were aware
needed to be intervened) are the two most common types of undermining
73. Id. at 102.
74. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 15; see also INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANKS AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 65, at xiii.
75. See QUINTYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64.
76. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 160.
77. QUINTYN &TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 3-6.
78. YOUNG SHIM, The Korean Financial Crisis, 2 Y.B. INT'L FIN. & ECON. LAW 501-25
(1997).
79. QUINTYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 6.
80. Id. at 7.
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the integrity of the supervisory function." 81
Once the case for regulatory independence is presented for purposes of
achieving financial stability, useful analogies can be extracted from the
theoretical background of CBI. 82
Time-inconsistency problems can be identified in the pursuit of finan-
cial stability, which would require the enactment of adequate regulations
aimed at the soundness of the banking system. As described by Quintyn
and Taylor, "[s]hort-term political objectives do not always coincide with
this need for a clear and stable set of rules and regulations" and are not
compatible with the pursuit of a long-term goal of financial stability.83
Undue political influence would harm the credibility of a regulatory and
supervisory system and possibly discourage investments in and the devel-
opment of the banking system. In addition, the authors acknowledge that
"[b]ank liquidations are typically politically unpopular since they can re-
sult in genuine hardship for depositors and other creditors. ' 84 Consider-
ing that depositors are voters, "[v]ote-maximizing politicians with shorter
time horizons than supervisors may be concerned about the short-term
costs of bank closure, whether fiscal, in terms of lost votes, or in terms of
lost campaign contributions. '8 5 Thus, the supervisory activities could be
compromised by undue political influence, as assistance packages are un-
duly granted and interventions delayed for the achievement of short-term
and popular goals.86
4. Institutions, Growth, and Credibility
Economic literature has outlined the relationship between legal and
political regimes and institutions on the one side, and economic growth
on the other. There is an agreement in literature that the strengthening
of institutions in developing countries is a necessary measure towards ec-
onomic growth.8 7 Economic literature considers that weak institutions
affect growth because they generate unnecessary transaction and trans-
formation costs. 88 "Institutions may be [considered] weak because rules
simply are absent, rules are suboptimal, or useful rules are poorly en-
forced." 89 For example, Janine Aron attributes the lack of correlation
between the central bank's constitutional autonomy and low inflation in
developing countries to the weakness of the judiciary in enforcing such
81. Id. at 6.
82. See id. at 10-13.
83. Id. at 11.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 9, at 120 (recognizing that bank regulators with-
out political independence "may not be able to sell banking properties [of an insol-
vent institution] through arm's length transactions.").
87. Janine Aron, Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence, 15 WORLD BANK
RES. OBSERVER 99, 99-135 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/rcscarch/
journals/wbro/obsfeb00/Article_6.pdf.
88. NORTH, supra note 1. See Aron, supra note 87, at 104.
89. Aron, supra note 87, at 104.
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autonomy.90
Discussions concerning the relationship between institutions and
growth are complex and involve the definitions of a variety of concepts.
A consensus has not been reached on the definitions of institutions or
economic growth. For example, institutions may be comprised of infor-
mal and formal sets of rules. Economic literature presents several indica-
tors of the measures of such relationships. In this respect, several factors
have been established to qualify the degree of influence of institutions in
a country's growth, such as political stability, ethnic diversity, religious or
colonial heritage, and past growth. 91
It is important to note that the institutions comprising financial regula-
tion and supervision of a country are taken into consideration in studies
with respect to the relationship between institutions and growth. Aron
exemplifies the relationship between institutions and central bank inde-
pendence,92 and Josd Tavares highlights certain connecting factors of
banking regulation and supervision with economic growth in Portugal. 93
There are two main applications of the institutions/growth relationship
to financial regulation and supervision, and both derive from the notion
of capital and financing to development 94 or of the level of investment as
a determinant factor of growth.95
Pursuant to the first application, strong institutions in connection with
banking regulation and supervision guarantee an efficient allocation of
resources (savings) arising from the activity of financial intermediaries.
Tavares points out that "[o]ne of the preeminent economic institutions,
secure property and contract rights, is seen as key for banks and financial
institutions to work properly[; whereas,] [w]eak contract enforcement
creates incentives for default by debtors and decreases willingness to
lend."'96 In other words, sound investor or consumer protections upon
the enactment of sound prudential regulation, including authorization re-
quirements, capital adequacy requirements, regulation of banking trans-
actions, and intervention and liquidation procedures, are an institutional
requirement for growth. Within this context, RSI of monetary authorities
can be advocated as an instrument of growth to the extent that it allows
sound prudential regulation and avoids inadequate political and industry
influence.
90. Id.
91. See R.J. Barro, Democracy and Growth, J. ECON. GROWrH 1, 1-27 (1996).
92. Aron, supra note 87, at 104.
93. Josd Tavares, Faculdade de Economia Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Firms, Finan-
cial Markets and the Law: Institutions and Economic Growth in Portugal (Feb.
2002) (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.fe.unl.pt/--jtavares/InstitutionsandEco
nomicGrowthinPortugal.pdf (paper prepared for the Conference, Desenvolvi-
mento Econ6mico Portugues no Espago Europeu: Determinantes e Polfticas, or-
ganized by the Banco de Portugal, Lisboa, Portugal).
94. Id. at 28.
95. Aron, supra note 87, at 100.
96. Tavares, supra note 93, at 28.
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The second application refers to the systemic aspect of banking regula-
tion and supervision, and to the relation of efficient investment to growth.
Within a scenario of financial globalization and the consequent capital
flows amongst nations, efficient designs of financial regulation and super-
vision will grant a given country the necessary credibility for receiving
cross-border investments and will allow such a country to benefit from
the economic growth arising there from. To the extent that financial sta-
bility is achieved by means of RSI of monetary authorities (since the
presence of strong institutions signals to the international community of
the commitment of a given country to financial stability), RSI can again
be considered an institutional arrangement that supports growth.
5. Final Considerations
The purpose of this chapter is not to make a panacea in connection
with RSI, and critics in connection with the subject are acknowledged.
Quintyn and Taylor highlight the argument developed by Edward
Kane,97 who argues that "the incentives faced by regulators differ from
those faced by conservative central bankers" and "regulatory forbearance
[would] arise. . . from self-interested actions of regulators rather than
those of politicians" due to their incentive structure. 98 In addition, the
authors argue that RSI gives supervisors the "coercive power of the state
against private citizens" (non-existent in CBI), and independence to such
bodies could be dangerous and against democratic values. 99 As further
demonstrated herein, these arguments are outplayed by adequate ac-
countability mechanisms, appropriate incentive structures, and institu-
tional mechanisms.
With respect to developing countries, critics argue that granting legal
independence to institutions may be a wrong alternative. In the context
of CBI, Christos Hadjiemmanuil argues that "[g]iven the distance be-
tween legal arrangements and practical application, which is particularly
pronounced in countries lacking a tradition of good governance, legal in-
dependence may become a dead letter, concealing, rather than minimiz-
ing, the politicization of monetary policy."1 00 Drawing an analogy to
RSI, the merits of the arrangement are considerably hindered in a coun-
try with weak institutions and credibility, as stated in section 2.4 above,
and with personnel lacking appropriate regulatory expertise.
In sum, despite RSI's critics, the theoretical background outlined above
supports a strong case for this institutional arrangement. The next sec-
97. QUINTYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 10 (citing Edward J. Kane, Principal-Agent
Problems in S&L Salvage, 45 J. FIN. 755 (1995)).
98. Id. at 12-13.
99. Id. at 13.
100. Camilla Gomes Nogueira Cortez, Sociedade De Estudos Juridicos, Central Bank-
ing and Monetary Policy in Brazil, at 26, available at http://www.socejur.com.br/arti
gos/banking.doc (last visited Apr. 6, 2004) (citing Christos Hadjiemmanuil, The
Choice of Institutions for Monetary Stability in an Emerging Economy: Indepen-
dent Central Bank or Currency Board?, 36 L. & ECON. 35 (1999)).
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tion will address the institutional and legal framework that guarantees
RSI.
C. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF REGULATORY
AND SUPERVISORY INDEPENDENCE
1. Introduction
This chapter will analyze the legal and institutional arrangements that
guarantee RSI of monetary authorities. Literature refers to institutional
independence as "the status of the agency as an institution separate from
the executive and legislative branches."' 1 Although it is recognized that
governments, through the executive or legislative branches, have the ulti-
mate power to restructure the agency, institutional arrangements are nec-
essary for the officers of agencies or monetary authorities to have "the
widest possible room for manoeuvre" in regulating and supervizing the
banking industry. 10 2
Thus, legal arrangements are an important factor of RSI. Indepen-
dence should be recognized in the constitution, in applicable laws, or by
contract (statutory independence), so that the government is bound by
the rule. The purpose is not, however, to make a panacea out of institu-
tional arrangements. As noted by Ramirez, the legal structure of an
agency is only part of the agency's political independence, as ultimately,
the political branches (the legislative branch, in particular) have the
power to restructure the agency or limit its independence. 03 Therefore,
independence will depend "not only upon the agency's structure, but also
upon the strength of presidential and congressional commitment to its
independence." 104
2. Institutional Dimension of Independence
a. Appointment, Dismissal and Terms of Office
Clear rules in connection with appointment and dismissal avoid discre-
tionary governmental influence in the regulatory and supervisory body
and grant officers a reasonable degree of freedom in conducting the
agency's functions. For purposes of CBI, Lastra argues that the appoint-
ment of governors of monetary authorities should be pluralistic, which
implies the participation of bodies or economic agents in addition to the
government.10 5 A pluralistic appointment would divide the sources of
possible influence within the authority. Clear rules of dismissal are also
an important aspect of institutional independence and should be based
upon an officer's competence and probity, 10 6 rather than upon the deci-
101. QuINTrYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 20.
102. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 10.
103. Ramirez, supra note 43, at 517-18.
104. Id. at 518.
105. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 27-28.
106. Id. at 31 (defending that the grounds for dismissal, as adjudicated by an indepen-
dent court of justice, should include the following: criminal offence or serious mis-
conduct, permanent incapability, and serious lack of fulfillment of obligations).
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sions they reach. 10 7 As explained below, revision of decisions should be
part of accountability arrangements and should be carried out by an inde-
pendent branch, such as the judiciary. Finally, agencies should have a
sufficiently long term of office to safeguard independence and prevent
undue political influence under short-term perspectives. 10 8
b. Other Personnel Concerns - Suitability, Salary, and Restrictions
Lastra'0 9 and Quintyn and Taylor 110 advocate the position that officers
of regulatory and supervisory bodies should have skills compatible with
banking regulation and supervision. This correlates with a main rationale
behind independent agencies, which is to provide adequate regulation
and supervision to a complex industry, the development of which is con-
stant due to changes in the economy, technology, and in the international
scenario. Skilled professionals should be selected based on legal require-
ments for academic and professional qualifications, as well as evidence of
previous experience within the industry and with the tasks that a given
position requires.
Measures should also be taken in order to grant officers professional
independence, both from the industry and from the government. A guar-
antee of an adequate salary is an institutional arrangement that fulfills
such a purpose, as it attracts skilled and qualified professionals to the
regulatory body and hinders the incentive for additional compensation or
bribery practices from the industry-side. Additional measures that en-
courage independence can be achieved with restrictions to the officers of
regulatory agencies. During their terms of office, such officers should not
perform activities that are incompatible with their regulatory and supervi-
sory tasks, which might generate conflicts of interest between the goals of
sound banking regulation and supervision, the industry's interest, and
even governmental goals.1"
Similarly, conflicts of interest can be avoided by restricting officers of
regulatory and supervisory bodies after they leave office to avoid cap-
ture-related problems and electoral-related conflicts of interest. Lastra
argues that "[c]entral bank officials should. . .be limited in their ability to
pursue private employment in credit and financial institutions" and "inel-
igible to become government officials" for a reasonable period following
their term of office.1 2 This would be an incentive for officers not to at-
tend to industry's interests or short-term and popular goals in detriment
of long-term sound banking regulation and supervision. Nevertheless, ar-
rangements have to be put in place so that those officers are guaranteed
an adequate wage during such restrictive period.
107. See QUINTYN &TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 20.
108. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 30.
109. Id. at 32.
110. QUINTYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64. at 20.
111. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 34.
112. Id. at 35.
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c. Governance Structure and Decisional Autonomy (RSI Stricto
Sensu)
The design of the governance structure and decision-making proce-
dures of agencies are crucial for the maintenance of independence and
the achievement of a consistent regulatory and supervisory scheme.
Quintyn and Taylor recommend multi-member commissions to guarantee
a continuous decision-making process and avoid the influence of a single
individual. 113 The authors also advocate thorough transparency and dis-
closure within the decision-making process, "making it possible for both
the public and the industry to scrutinize regulatory decisions minimizing
the risk of political interference.' 1 14 In addition, the agency in charge of
banking regulation and supervision should have independence on the
performance of its tasks or, in other words, regulatory and supervisory
independence stricto sensu.
Quintyn and Taylor suggest the following legal designs to safeguard
supervisory independence: (1) legal protection to bank supervisors upon
the execution of their supervisory task, so that supervisors cannot be
threatened by lawsuits and other means for reasonable performance of
their functions; (2) a transparent rules-based system of sanctions and in-
terventions, in order to remove discretion in individual cases, and there-
fore, industry capture;1 15 and (3) adequate and transparent administrative
procedures in connection with sanctioning financial institutions (in partic-
ular, with adequate time limits for appeals). 116
d. Budgetary or Financial Autonomy
Quintyn and Taylor define budgetary independence as "the role of the
executive/legislature in the determination of the size of the agency's
budget and its use, including staffing of the agency and salary levels." 11 7
In general, agencies can be funded by the government either from their
supervisory ministry or directly from the budget or alternatively, from the
regulated industry.
In the first case, agencies may be open to political interference of dif-
ferent sorts, including: (1) not having enough budget to conduct adequate
wage policies; (2) the budget may be subject to cuts during periods of
fiscal austerity; and (3) manipulation by politicians if the agency is pursu-
ing ends that are contrary to political interests. If the money has to come
from the government budget, the agency's budget should be "proposed
and justified by the agency, based on objective criteria related to develop-
113. QuiNy & TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 20.
114. Id.
115. We acknowledge that supervisors should have some level of discretion in view of
systemic concerns and available bailout mechanisms to failing banks. Neverthe-
less, such level of discretion should be based upon defined parameters to avoid
capture by the industry.
116. Id. at 17-18.
117. Id. at 21.
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ments in the markets." 118
In the second case in which resources are obtained from the regulated
industry through such means as collection of fees upon the exercise of the
supervisory activity, legal and accountability mechanisms should be in
place so that fees are reasonably defined and budgetary dependence from
the industry does not exist. That can be achieved with objective and
transparent criteria for the collection of such fees.
3. Accountable Independence
As described above, the creation of independent agencies generates
concerns of legitimacy within a democratic regime especially in view of
the broad reach of supervisory powers. Also, there is a consensus in liter-
ature about the legitimacy of independent agencies, provided that ade-
quate mechanisms are in place in order to guarantee their accountability.
In general, an accountability system requires that the agency justify its
policies and actions, and the agency must account for the decisions made
in the execution of its responsibilities.1 19
Several legal structures can be set out to achieve accountable indepen-
dence. Page recognizes three models of "regulatory legitimacy" relevant
for the establishment of regulatory accountability and control: (1) legisla-
tive mandate; (2) oversight; and (3) due process.120 The legislative man-
date model sets forth that "agency action is deserving of support when it
is authorized by the legislature.' 121 This is the statutory form of account-
ability, which is provided by legislation itself in the form of objectives and
principles to be followed by the regulatory and supervisory body. The
imposition of goals and general duties opens the way for judicial revision
of the agency's actions. The oversight or "checks and balances" model is
characterized by the "subjection of the regulator to adequate checks and
balances.' 22 It is derived from the constitutional and administrative law
theory of checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial powers. This model includes internal controls, ministerial controls,
parliamentary controls, judicial controls, and stakeholders' controls.
Control by the executive (ministerial control) is a crucial feature of bank-
ing regulation. The applicable national treasury or finance ministry has
its role in the formulation of monetary policy. Moreover, a degree of
information exchange and cooperation with the main financial and mone-
tary authorities is advisable.' 23 In the Brazilian independent agency de-
sign, for example, agencies are submitted to ministerial control depending
118. Id.
119. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 49.
120. Alan Page, Regulating the Regulator - A Lawyer's Perspective on Accountability, in
REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE TWENTY FIRST CEN-
TURY 127-49 (C.A.E. Goodhart & E. Ferran eds., 2001).
121. See id. at 129.
122. Id.
123. See QUINTYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 30, (describing the "dialogue model,"
which contemplates that regulators should do their best to be informed about the
intentions, wishes, and opinions of the political leadership and to anticipate their
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on the sector, and the executive has the power to indicate the directors of
such agencies.
Both on a periodic and extraordinary basis, parliamentary control im-
plies either direct control by the parliament, if the agency is not subject to
the direct control of the executive, or reporting requirements directly to
the parliament. 124 The Financial Services Authorities ("FSA"), a U.K.
mega-regulator, is accountable to ministers of the Parliament and has to
submit an annual report to the scrutiny of the legislative body. 125 The
FSA is also required to make reports in connection with its activities,
including an annual report of its operations to the Congress.' 26 In Brazil,
the Senate may direct inquiries to the directors of certain agencies, in-
cluding the independent agencies, the antitrust authority, and the central
bank.
Some authors classify judicial control under the legislative mandate
model, as it purports to control the lawfulness of the agency's acts and
decisions in the fulfillment of its functions. 27 It must be understood that
judicial control is a crucial part of any accountability mechanism, espe-
cially if there are laws setting forth the limits, goals, and parameters for
the rules and supervisory activities carried out by the agencies. With re-
spect to the Brazilian regulatory system, Tojal advocates a thorough con-
trol of the agencies by the judiciary, including verification of the
implementation of statutory goals and directives of agencies. 128
Although accountability mechanisms available to the industry should
be limited in order to discourage regulatory capture, stakeholders' con-
trol refers to the exercise of accountability by industry and consumers. 129
Instruments of public participation in the decision-making process of reg-
ulatory agencies, including public consultations, public meetings, and for-
mal accusations by the public and interested parties, are examples of
stakeholders' control.130
Internal controls can be an additional mechanism of accountability,
particularly if the committee or persons performing this function are
granted a considerable degree of independence from the directors of the
agencies through, for example, a transparent dismissal procedure. Such
controls may verify how the agency is conducting its financial affairs, the
efficiency of allocation of resources, and the overall performance of the
regulatory work. The FSA has a non-executive committee that performs
such internal controls. 131
reactions to new policy proposals; such model contemplates an "almost self-im-
posed" political control).
124. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 54-55.
125. See Page, supra note 120, at 133.
126. See Ramirez, supra note 43, at 525-26.
127. See LASTRA, supra note 4, at 57.
128. Tojal, supra note 41, at 22.
129. See Page, supra note 120, at 135.
130. See Mattos, supra note 44, at 204.
131. See Page, supra note 120, at 131.
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Finally, the due process models consist of the adoption of adequate and
fair administrative procedures so that the agency can better serve the
public interest and provide equal treatment to those subject to their regu-
latory and supervisory activity. 132 Clear definitions and limitations of
rule-making, disciplinary, and enforcement powers will provide an addi-
tional control over the regulatory and supervisory activities, and will
grant those persons subject to regulation and supervision additional tools
through administrative procedures to question and contest unlawful rules
and supervision procedures.
It must be noted that arrangements for accountability must allow the
agencies to exercise discretion in a reasonable way, as there is a risk that
independence may be lost within the mechanisms of a strict accountabil-
ity regime. As pointed out by Quintyn and Taylor, "[p]roperly designed
independence arrangements MUST INCLUDE mechanisms for holding the
agency accountable for the discharge of its functions without creating op-
portunities for ad hoc interference with its operations.' 33
4. Regulatory and Supervisory Structure
The final aspect of institutional independence is the choice of regula-
tory structure, which should contemplate the mechanisms and arrange-
ments described above to achieve accountable independence.
Throughout the present work, the terms "agency," "regulatory and super-
visory bodies," and "monetary authorities" refer to financial regulators
and supervisors. The reason for such broad terminology is that there are
existing debates in the literature over who should perform banking regu-
lation and supervision. The two main debates concern the creation of a
"mega-regulator," which would be an appropriate structure to regulate
and supervise financial conglomerates, and the attribution of the regula-
tory and supervisory activities to an agency different than the central
bank. These debates will be briefly addressed here, from the perspective
of RSI.
Some qualifications are necessary before addressing the debates. Eco-
nomic and legal literature presents a variety of optimal regulatory designs
with differing degrees of independence and autonomy. Taking into con-
sideration the popular Brazilian expression that "the paper accepts every-
thing," optimal regulatory and supervisory designs must be analyzed with
a degree of care. Also, it is doubtful that a pure design would be applica-
ble to any given country. As pointed out by Goodhart and his colleagues,
"[d]ifferences in institutional structure are the result of several factors:
historical evolution, the structure of the financial system, political struc-
tures and traditions, and the size of the country and financial sector." 134
Provided that the objectives of regulation are duly pursued, the optimal
design will invariably be dependent upon the specific characteristics of a
132. See id. at 137.
133. QUINTYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 29 (emphasis added).
134. GOODHART ET. AL., supra note 9, at 145.
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given country, and any suggestions in this regard should be qualified in
this way.
The case for a "mega-regulator" or an integrated financial authority,
defined as a regulatory and supervisory body regulating and supervising
the banking, securities and insurance sectors, is advocated in view of the
growing existence of financial conglomerates 135 and the constant diversi-
fication of the activities of banks, which are not confined to the tradi-
tional banking business. From the perspective of RSI, authors agree that
such an agency could benefit from the existing independence of regula-
tory bodies of the different sectors. On the other hand, strict and power-
ful mechanisms of accountability would have to be in place because such
a body would encompass overwhelming adjudicative and legislative
powers.
Changing a system of separate regulatory and supervisory bodies for
different financial sectors into an integrated system is not an easy task.
Many costs are involved in the process, including the dismissal and alloca-
tion of personnel and the recording and transmission of "regulatory
memory. ' '136 In addition, such change of regime is considerable in the
regulatory culture of any country. The implementation of an integrated
regulator in Brazil, for example, would face both obstacles, and it would
be hardly feasible. Therefore, in light of the purpose of this article, i.e., to
evaluate RSI of Brazilian monetary authorities, the analysis of the
"mega-regulator" structure will be limited.
On the other hand, the debate on the separation of regulatory and su-
pervisory functions from central banks can bring some interesting ideas
and suggestions to the Brazilian regulatory model, especially because the
Brazilian legal system contemplates the existence of independent agen-
cies as described above.
Arguments exist for and against the separation of regulatory and su-
pervisory functions from central banks. 37 The main argument for sepa-
ration is the potential conflict of interest between banking supervision
135. Id. at 147. The authors present a useful definition of financial conglomerates based
on the De Swaan Report of the Tripartitie Group of Bank, Securities and Insur-
ance Regulators (The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates): "any group of
companies under common control whose exclusive or predominant activities con-
sist of providing services in at least two different financial sectors (banking, securi-
ties, insurance)." Id.
136. As set forth by Goodhart and his co-authors, "[t]he creation of a single regulator
would involve a loss of potentially valuable information simply because a single
approach was adopted. In effect, there is merit in having a degree of competition
and diversity in regulation so that lessons can be learned from the experience of
different approaches." Id. at 154.
137. See Joseph J. Norton, Structuring the Banking Regulators and Supervisors: Devel-
oped Country Experiences and Their Possible Implications for Latin America and
Other Developing Countries, 4 NAPTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 5, 5-29 (1998);
CHARLES GOODHART & DIRK SCHOENMAKER, THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUC-
TURE OF BANKING SUPERVISION: INSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION BETWEEN SUPERVI-
SORY AND MONETARY AGENCIES (London School of Economics, Financial
Markets Group, Special Paper No. 52, 1993), available at http://fmg.lse.ac.uk/pdfs/
sp0052.pdf.
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and monetary policy. Determining interest rates in connection with the
injection or withdrawal of reserves is a clear example of such conflict.
Monetary authorities will likely pursue higher rates for such purposes as
achieving price stability, maintaining an exchange rate peg, or reducing
monetary growth. Meanwhile, regulatory authorities are concerned with
the adverse effects of higher rates upon bad debts, profitability, capital
adequacy, and the solvency of the banking system.138 Therefore, the reg-
ulatory concern within a central bank would jeopardize the pursuit by
such authority of adequate monetary policies.
Joseph Norton adds that separation is also a useful tool to guard the
reputation and credibility of a central bank because the bank is not made
liable for banking failures or crises. 139 In addition, he argues that the
increasingly diverse nature of financial institutions prevents the central
bank from administering adequate supervision. 140 Nevertheless, he rec-
ognizes that the lack of experienced financial personnel in developing
countries hinders the weight of this argument, and useful synergies are
gained "by placing banking supervision under the central bank's
responsibility.'141
The three main arguments against separation are those relating to the
central bank's lender of last resort function, those involving the system of
payments, and those advancing the need for consistency between mone-
tary policy and banking supervision. 142 The first two arguments derive
from the simple notion that whoever pays for a risk taken by third parties
should be able to monitor the behavior of the persons taking such risk. If
the central bank is the one performing the lender of last resort function
by paying for the rescue of illiquid and insolvent authorities and guaran-
teeing liquidity risks within the payment system, then regulation and su-
pervision of the behavior of banks and of the participation in the
payment system are justified and necessary. 143 Norton suggests that
"[t]he separation of the central bank from the banking supervisory func-
tions is an effective separation of the lender of last resort from the infor-
mation it needs to exercise its duties.' 144 The final argument, in
connection with the consistency between monetary policy and banking
supervision, concludes that monetary stability and financial stability are
two sides of the same coin. 145 Therefore, the authority elaborating mone-
tary policy should have a "comprehensive and intimate understanding of
the workings of the banking system."'1 46 Concentrating the roles in one
body would be an optimal method of achieving such a result.
138. GOODHART & SCHOENMAKER, supra note 137, at 6.
139. See Norton, supra note 137, at 10-11.
140. Id. at 10.
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id.
143. See GOODHART & SCHOENMAKER, supra note 137, for a thorough analysis.
144. Norton, supra note 137, at 11.
145. See QUINTYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 24.
146. Norton, supra note 137, at 12.
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Thus, it is possible to say that separation and concentration are feasible
regulatory designs, and their implementation will depend on the regula-
tory culture of a given country. Nevertheless, given the traditional roles
of the central bank and the systemic concerns arising from financial
globalization, the study of both arrangements makes it clear that a degree
of interaction and transparency among the authority elaborating mone-
tary policy, the body exercising the functions of lender of last resort, the
body guaranteeing liquidity in the payment system, and the regulatory
and supervisory agency of the financial sector is vital and indispensable.
Discussions regarding separation and concentration have interesting
implications in relation to RSI. Quintyn and Taylor argue that concentra-
tion favors RSI because CBI has found wide recognition in the last de-
cades, and "supervisors could 'piggyback' and enjoy (or build up) the
same degree of autonomy and prestige. ' 147 By the same token, separa-
tion is highly advisable when the central bank of a given country does not
enjoy an adequate degree of independence. In addition, some countries
provide for special independence regimes for regulatory and supervisory
agencies, mainly in connection with public utilities. In this case separa-
tion would cause banking supervisors and regulators to "piggyback" simi-
lar degrees of independence.
III. EVALUATING BRAZILIAN MONETARY AUTHORITIES
A. BRAZILIAN MONETARY AUTHORITIES AND RSI
1. Introduction
The present section purports to evaluate the level of RSI of Brazilian
monetary authorities. The first part outlines the history of monetary au-
thorities in Brazil and will demonstrate a certain degree of political and
industry influence in monetary, and banking affairs, even in the first mon-
etary authorities of the country. The second section addresses the current
legal and institutional framework of Brazilian monetary authorities and
evaluates its degree of institutional RSI. The third section addresses the
material commitment of Brazilian political authorities to RSI of mone-
tary authorities and to sound banking regulation and supervision, espe-
cially after the implementation of the Real Plan (as defined below). The
last section discusses the case for institutional RSI of Brazilian monetary
authorities and presents suggestions to improve institutional RSI within
the Brazilian banking sector.
2. Brazilian Monetary Authorities - A Story of Influences
a. The Path Towards a Central Bank
The monetary history of Brazil begins with the opening of the ports
and the liberalization of trade phenomena observed after the Portuguese
royal family moved to then Portuguese Brazil following Napoleon's inva-
147. QUINTYN & TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 23.
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sion of the metropolis. 148 The first Bank of Brazil (Banco do Brasil) was
created by royal decree. The bank performed the basic functions of fi-
nancing the government and performing currency exchange functions,
which were vital for commerce at the time. The official bank had a short
life, as it became insolvent when King John VI returned to Portugal, tak-
ing with him all of the gold deposited in the bank. This event sets the
benchmark for undue political influence in the monetary authorities of
Brazil. Even after independence, following administrations attempted to
use a state bank for financing purposes. As described by Saddi, funds
were easily transferred from the Bank of Brazil to the Treasury, and the
relationship of such bodies was characterized by a "thick fog of
complicity. ' 1
49
Nevertheless, the Bank of Brazil, even when controlled by the private
sector, played an important role in connection with determining the value
of the currency and organizing public finance.1 50 After the proclamation
of the Republic in 1889, Brazil faced several monetary problems includ-
ing devaluation of the currency, inflation, and a lack of control of finan-
cial intermediation. These situations culminated in the merger of the
Bank of the Republic of the United States of Brazil (Banco da Reptiblica
dos Estados Unidos do Brasil) and the Bank of Brazil. This merger gen-
erated a new entity known as the Bank of the Republic of Brazil (Banco
da Reptiblica do Brasil), which was ultimately granted a monopoly in is-
suing currency. This entity was liquidated in 1900, thus characterizing the
first period of Brazil's monetary history with budgetary unbalances, infla-
tionary actions, and currency devaluation because of undue political
influence.1 51
In the following years, certain legislative attempts to implement further
monetary controls within the Bank of Brazil were made. 152 Nevertheless,
the first centralized monetary authority was created through Decree Law
No. 7,293 of February 2, 1945. The Superintendence of Currency and
Credit (Superintend~ncia da Moeda e do Cr~dito - SUMOC) was in-
tended to control the payment system and the money market to prepare
the country for the organization of a central bank.
After the implementation of SUMOC, Brazil experimented with a dual
system of monetary authorities or bodies, as certain attributions were still
shared with Bank of Brazil. On one hand, SUMOC's responsibilities in-
cluded: (1) setting commercial bank reserve requirements and discount
rates; (2) setting interest rates; (3) supervising the operation of commer-
cial banks; (4) carrying out open market operations (purchase and sale of
securities issued by the National Treasury); (5) defining the foreign ex-
148. See JAIRO SADDI, 0 PODER E 0 COFRE: REPENSANDO o BANCO CENTRAL 171(1997); JORGE CALDEIRA, MAUA: EMPRESARIO Do IMPER1O (16th ed. 1999).
149. SADDI, supra note 148, at 173.
150. See id.; CALDEIRA, supra note 148.
151. SADDI, supra note 148, at 174.
152. See id. at 175-76 (concerning the Caixa de Emissdo de Redescontos do Banco do
Brasil and the Caixa de Mobilizagdo Banctria do Ministerio da Fazenda).
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change policy; and (6) representing Brazil before international institu-
tions.153 On the other hand, the Bank of Brazil continued to act as the
government's bank by offering unlimited overdraft protection to the gov-
ernment.154 Jairo Saddi points out that SUMOC never had normative
competence over issues of monetary policy or credit policy because it was
not responsible for monetary stability.155 Certain crucial functions for
the purpose of monetary stability, such as the management of the com-
pensation system, financial agency of the federal government (acting as
depositary of its revenues), payment and financing of the budgetary defi-
cits of the National Treasury, and lender of last resort, were performed by
the Bank of Brazil.
The relative confusion of roles in the conduction of monetary and
credit policies in an environment of fiscal disorientation, budgetary un-
balance, and a high level of inflation, composed a background favorable
to the creation of centralized monetary authorities with well-defined roles
in respect to the control of monetary and financial policies. Such a scena-
rio culminated in the creation of the Central Bank of Brazil and contrib-
uted to the design of the main features that still characterize Brazil's
monetary authority.
b. The Creation of the Central Bank of Brazil
Within the military regime, the National Monetary Council (Conselho
Monetdrio Nacional - CMN) and the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Cen-
tral do Brasil - BACEN) were created through Law No. 4,595 of Decem-
ber 31, 1964. BACEN was granted a monopoly in issuing the national
currency and was deemed the supervisory authority of monetary and
banking policies. The CMN was designed as a superior authority, a col-
legiate organ encompassing the main normative functions of the financial
sector.
The CMN was initially composed of nine members, three of which
were the Treasury Minister, the president of the Bank of Brazil, and the
president of the National Bank of Economic Development (Banco Na-
cional de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico).156 The other six members were
mandated a fixed term of seven years. The Central Bank was organized
as an autarquia,157 subject to the control of the Treasury Ministry, and the
president was appointed by the CMN.
There is a consensus that BACEN was granted a considerable degree of
153. Decree-Law No. 7,293 of Feb. 2, 1945, art. 3 [Decreto-Lei No. 7,293 de 2 de fever-
eiro de 1945, artigo 3] (Braz.).
154. See SADDI, supra note 148, at 177; see also Cortez, supra note 100, at 3.
155. SADDI, supra note 148, at 178.
156. Currently, the financing towards development is carried out by the National Bank
for Economic and Social Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Eco-
n6mico e Social - BNDES).
157. See supra note 46 above.
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independence at the time of its creation.158 This independence was grad-
ually undermined by the "government's commitment to growth at all
costs during the military dictatorship." 159 Originally designed to
strengthen the central bank and prevent interference from the govern-
ment, even the CMN, was "completely disfigured during the military dic-
tatorship.' 160 As set forth by Camilla Gomes Nogueira Cortez,
"[c]onstant increases in the government's representation in the Council
and the extension of its scope ended up extinguishing its original neutral-
ity."' 61 The causes for such policy changes were derived from the initial
concern in 1964 over solving problems with the balance of payments and
consequent access to international credit. In light of these concerns, the
existing monetary system was reformed in order to correct monetary im-
perfections and attract foreign capital. Such changes were abandoned af-
ter the improvement of the international environment.
Finally, it must be noted that the Bank of Brazil continued to play an
important role as a monetary authority. In fact, Brazil experimented an-
other dual period, during which the Bank of Brazil acted as an agent of
the government in connection with the government's development and
credit policies. According to Saddi, the Bank of Brazil had more powers
than the new central bank, encompassing functions such as the financial
and credit agent of the National Treasury, collector of federal taxes and
revenues, and maker of payments in connection with the federal
budget. 162
The Bank of Brazil only ceased to be a monetary authority upon the
enactment of Decree No. 2,283 of February 27, 1986 and Decree No.
2,284 of March 10, 1986. The most important measure of such decrees
was the extinction of the movement account (conta movimento), through
which the Bank of Brazil could withdraw funds from BACEN to bear
expenses of the government. This account enabled the Bank of Brazil to
perform issuance of currency for purposes of government financing and
was used to inject money into the country's economy.
In view of the above, it should be noted that Brazilian monetary au-
thorities have been subject to political influence even after the creation of
the central bank. The creation of the Real Plan and consequent eco-
nomic stabilization during the nineties generated a different situation in
which a commitment towards independent institutions was observed by
the administration.
158. See ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS, A LANTERNA NA POPA - MEM6RIAS (4th
ed. 2001); SADDI, supra note 148, at 180-83; Cortez, supra note 100, at 5.
159. Cortez, supra note 100, at 5 (stating "[t]he first attempt to reduce the [BACEN]'s
autonomy occurred in early 1967, when President Arthur da Costa e Silva replaced
[BACEN]'s governor, Denis Chagas Nogueira, by Rui Aguiar da Silva Lerma, in
spite of the fact that his term of office had not expired. As a result, under the
government of Costa e Silva, the National Monetary Council and the [BACEN]
became institutions that fully backed the government's expansionist policies.").
160. Id. at 6.
161. Id.
162. SADDI, supra note 148, at 182.
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Currently, the CMN and BACEN are the monetary authorities in Bra-
zil and both bodies enact what was defined here as banking regulation.
BACEN is the organ responsible for banking supervision. The next sec-
tion will address the current institutional and legal framework and the
regulatory and supervisory competences of such bodies in order to evalu-
ate the degree of RSI of such institutions.
3. CMN and BACEN - Institutional Framework
Article 192 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 provides the general
framework of the so-called Brazilian Financial System. The article states
that a complementary law shall set forth the regulation of the financial
system. 163 Because no complementary law was enacted for such a pur-
pose to the present date, Law No. 4,595/64 currently regulates the finan-
cial system in Brazil in addition to creating the CMN and BACEN. 164
Originally enacted as an ordinary law, it was granted the status of com-
plementary law by a phenomenon known as "constitutional
reception. " 165
In accordance with article 8 of Law No. 9,069 of June 29, 1995, the
CMN is a collegiate organ composed of the following members: (1) Trea-
sury Ministry (Ministro de Estado da Fazenda), who will be the president
of the CMN; (2) the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management
(Ministro de Estado do Planejamento, Or~amento e Gestdo); and (3) the
president of BACEN. Pursuant to article 3 of Law No. 4,595/64, the pol-
icy goals of the CMN are described as follows: (1) to adapt the volume of
the means of payment to the needs of the national economy and its devel-
opment; (2) to regulate the internal value of the currency, preventing or
correcting inflation or deflation outbreaks of internal or external origin,
economic depressions, and other disruptions in the economic equilibrium;
(3) to regulate the external value of the currency and the balance of pay-
ments of the country; (4) to orient the application of the resources of
private and public financial institutions; (5) to improve institutions and
financial instruments for purposes of providing more efficiency to the
payment system; (6) to oversee the liquidity and solvency of financial in-
stitutions; and (7) to coordinate the monetary, credit, budgetary, fiscal,
and external and internal public debt policies.
163. In the Brazilian legislative system, a complementary law requires a qualified quo-
rum for its approval (absolute majority). See BRAz. CONST. art. 69 (Federal Con-
stitution of 1988).
164. In addition to the CMN and BACEN, other authorities can be identified in the
Brazilian Financial System such as the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Brazilian Development Bank, and the organs in charge of regulation and
supervision of insurance and re-insurance activities. This work will focus on the
activities of the CMN and the Central Bank; the organs responsible for banking
regulation and supervision.
165. Upon the promulgation of a new constitution, the laws and rules of the existing
legal system are amended or interpreted in a manner to be consistent with the new
constitutional rules. As the existing law in connection with the financial system at
the time of the promulgation of the constitution, No. 4,595/64 was granted the
status of a complementary law.
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The goals and policies of the CMN reveal its broad authority in connec-
tion with monetary and credit policies. For purposes of the present work,
this analysis will focus on the goals and activities of the CMN in regard to
banking regulation and supervision.
With respect to supervisory and regulatory functions, the following ex-
clusive competences of the CMN are worth mentioning: (1) regulating
credit transactions; (2) regulating the incorporation, functioning, and su-
pervision of all entities that perform activities described under Law No.
4,595/64, as well as the applicable sanctions and penalties; (3) limiting
when necessary interest rates, discounts, commissions, and any other
form of consideration of transactions and financial or banking services,
including the services rendered by BACEN; (4) determining the maxi-
mum percentage of resources that financial institutions are allowed to
lend to a single client or corporate group; (5) regulating indexes and
other technical conditions about patrimonial relationships to be observed
by financial institutions; (6) enacting general accounting and statistic
rules to be observed by financial institutions; (7) determining minimum
capital adequacy requirements to be adopted by financial institutions; and
(8) regulating the limits, terms, and other conditions of discount and loan
transactions of private and public financial institutions. 166
The description of the policies and competences of the CMN leads to
the conclusion that it is not only the organ responsible for formulating the
monetary policy in Brazil, but also the main body in charge of banking
regulation in the country.
On the other hand, the enforcement of banking regulation and the su-
pervision of the banking activities and financial institution are granted to
the central bank.167
Articles 10 and 11 of Law No. 4,595/64 present an extensive list of the
competences of BACEN. Several competences reflect the implementa-
tion of the general rules and policies enacted by the CMN. Relevant for
the purposes here are the following competences: (1) establish reserve
requirements and receive the corresponding compulsory deposits; (2) ex-
ecute discount operations and grant loans to banking financial institu-
tions; (3) exercise the control of credit; (4) supervise the financial
institutions and enforce the applicable penalties; (5) grant authorization
for the incorporation (including branches and subsidiaries), mergers,
amalgamations, and other corporate transactions conducted by financial
institutions, as well as authorizing the performance of certain specific ac-
tivities such as foreign exchange transactions; (6) regulate the conditions
for the appointment and performance of managing or advisory positions
of private financial institutions, subject to the rules enacted by the CMN;
(7) regulate the payment system; and (8) exercise "permanent" oversight
of the financial and capital markets.168 As set forth above, BACEN re-
166. Law No. 4,595/64, art. 4 [Lei No. 4,595/64, art. 4] (Braz.).
167. Id. art. 9 [Lei No. 4,595/64, art. 91.
168. Id. arts. 10-11 [Lei No. 4,595/64, artigos 10 e 1l].
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placed the SUMOC, and was characterized by article 8 of Law No. 4,595
as an autarquia with legal personality and financial resources. The rela-
tionship and subordination of BACEN to the CMN is stressed by article 9
of Law No. 4,595, which sets forth that BACEN shall observe and enforce
the rules enacted by the CMN.
Pursuant to article 8 of Law No. 4,595/64, a president and eight other
directors appointed by the President of Brazil manage BACEN.
A description of the competences and activities of BACEN reveals its
supervisory role of banking activities and financial institutions, as well as
a complete subordination to the rules enacted by the CMN. The next
section addresses specific features of the CMN and BACEN that will al-
low the assessment of RSI of such institutions upon the parameters estab-
lished in Part I of the present work.
4. CMN and BACEN - Assessment of Institutional RSI
a. The Relationship Between the CMN and BACEN
A brief analysis of the constitutional and legal provisions of the Brazil-
ian financial system leads to the obvious conclusion that there is room for
political influence in the Brazilian monetary authorities. The presence of
two Ministries of State in the composition of the CMN highlights the
strong presence of the government in the authority responsible for elabo-
rating the main set of banking regulations for the country.
It is also clear that the CMN has a great influence over BACEN, the
body responsible for banking supervision. Not only does the CMN limit
the interest rates, discounts, commissions, and other forms of considera-
tion obtained through services rendered by BACEN (one of the main
sources of revenue of the institution), but it also approves the internal
rules of BACEN and its accounts. 169
In view of the above, it is clear that there is a strong political influence
on the authority in charge of formulating banking regulation. Pursuant to
the theoretical background outlined above, this could make the CMN
prone to time inconsistency and capture problems. The next sections fo-
cus on other independence factors of BACEN.
b. Appointment, Dismissal, and Terms of Office
Articles 52 and 84 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 regulate the ap-
pointment of the president of BACEN and its directors. By means of se-
cret vote, the Senate must approve the President of Brazil's nominations
for president or members of the management board of BACEN. 170 Pur-
suant to article 1 of Decree No. 91,961 of November 19, 1985, BACEN
shall be managed by a board composed of nine members, including the
president of BACEN. The President of Brazil appoints the members
169. Id. art. 4 (XXVII) [Lei No. 4,595/64, art. 4 (XXVII)]. Article 4 of Law No. 4,595
sets forth that CMN has the competence to approve the accounts of BACEN.
170. BRAZ. CONST. art. 52(III)(d).
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from a pool of Brazilians with outstanding capabilities in economical and
financial matters. With respect to dismissal procedures, the decree states
that the directors and presidents of BACEN may be dismissed "ad
nutum" or, stated differently, at the President's discretion.
The pluralistic appointment of the governors of BACEN is in accor-
dance with the applicable theory on RSI.171 The approval by the Senate
of the President's candidates also represents an important tool of ac-
countability and control of such procedures. On the other hand, the dis-
missal procedures of the governing body of BACEN are not clear. The
applicable legislation does not contemplate objective rules and standards
for dismissing the directors, and the presidential discretion in dismissal
represents a serious opening to undue political influence. This factor has
a serious implication in connection with terms of office. Originally, Law
No. 4,595/64 contemplated a six-year term, a mandate longer than the
presidential mandate, that would allow the directors of BACEN a certain
degree of independence from the executive branch. Currently, there is
no specific term for the governors of BACEN, whose mandates are sub-
ject to presidential discretion.
c. Other Personnel Concerns - Suitability, Salary, and Restrictions
The suitability of the governors of BACEN is contemplated in article 1
of Decree No. 91,961/85, which states that the suitability of the governors
of BACEN should be determined based on their "outstanding capacity in
economical and financial matters." More objective criteria is desirable,
including specific academic titles and a defined period of professional ex-
pertise. Nevertheless, the approval of the presidential appointment by
the Senate through public inquiry sessions and the pressures of external
markets guarantee that adequate expertise requirements are maintained
by the governors of the central bank. 172
Codified law establishes the salaries of the president and directors of
BACEN. Within the federal administration, the president and the direc-
tors of BACEN, considered to be the Positions in Commission of Special
Nature (Cargos em Comissdo de Natureza Especial - NES), are paid
monthly in the amount of R $8,000.00 (U.S.$ 2,676.03173 or
£1,701.56174).175
Considering the pattern of salaries paid within the banking industry, it
is fair to say that the salaries paid to the governors of BACEN are not
adequate, as they fail to attract skilled and qualified professionals and
hinder the incentive for bribery practices from the industry side. In fact,
171. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
172. Brazil has a tradition of appointing governors with great expertise, selected from
the main economic schools of the country.
173. Conversion effected on August 25, 2003, at the following rate: 2,9895000 Real/
Brazil = I U.S. dollar, available at http://www.bcb.gov.br.
174. Conversion effected on August 25, 2003, at the following rate: 4,7015600 Real!
Brazil = 1 Sterling Pound, available at http://www.bcb.gov.br.
175. Law No. 10,470 of June 25, 2002 [Lei No. 10,470 de 25 de junho de 2002] (Braz.).
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one of the great benefits of these positions is the possibility of occupying
a well-paid position within the banking industry after the expiration of
the terms of office. Governors of BACEN and even members of the
CMN have historically occupied important positions within the banking
industry after the expiration of their respective mandates.176
The above assertion leads us to the analysis of the restrictions imposed
on the governors of BACEN. Persons occupying Positions in Commis-
sion of Special Nature must not perform activities or render any services
in the sector in which they have acted within the governmental body for a
period of four months after the expiration of their mandates. 177 During
this restrictive period, the governors of BACEN cannot be employed as
managers, members of the board of directors, or establish an employment
relationship with any individual or legal entity that they have maintained
an official and relevant relationship with during the last six months before
dismissal or expiration of mandate. The same prohibition applies to legal
or administrative representation of such individuals or persons before or-
gans of the federal administration. During this restrictive period, the offi-
cials shall be paid a salary in the same amount of their remuneration
during the respective mandate.
Analyzing the appropriateness of the Brazilian salary arrangements is a
sensitive task. In view of the current fiscal deficit faced by Brazil and all
the efforts in connection with tax and pension reforms to correct such
deficit, raising salaries within the public service is a very polemic issue.
The restrictive period of CMN members and governors of BACEN is
too short to prevent industry capture and thus, should be extended. 178 In
addition, stricter and more detailed secrecy obligations to governors of
BACEN after the expiration of their mandate would hinder the potential
of industry or political capture.
d. Governance Structure and Decisional Autonomy
Because of the structure of the CMN, it is clear that the regulation-
making activity of Brazilian monetary authorities is not free from politi-
cal influence. Considering that the general rules and supervisory stan-
dards are set forth by the CMN, there is considerable political influence
in the supervision activity of BACEN.
Nevertheless, within the limits established by the rules of CMN,
BACEN has discretion and autonomy to perform banking supervision.
The analysis of the competences of BACEN outlined in Law No. 4,595/64
176. See Veja Magazine, Edition 1801 (May 7, 2003), available at http://veja.abril.uol.
com.br/070503/pjll0.html. Pedro Malan, former Treasury Ministry of the Cardoso
Administration, is currently employed as a vice-president of Unibanco, the third
largest private bank of Brazil. Armfnio Fraga, former president of BACEN, is
working with a private investment consulting firm.
177. Provisional Measure (Medida Provisdria) No. 2,225-45 of Sept. 4, 2001, art. 6
(Braz.).
178. LASTRA, supra note 4, at 35 (stating that members of the board of the Fed have to
observe a restrictive period of two years after the expiration of their mandates).
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corroborates this assertion.' 79 Because BACEN was granted the main set
of supervisory powers, it has the supervisory independence stricto
sensu. 18
0
In addition, Law No. 9,784 of January 29, 1999, Law No. 4,595/64, and
other rules enacted by CMN provide detailed administrative procedures
for supervising, sanctioning, liquidating, and performing interventions in
financial institutions. Moreover, the Brazilian superior courts recognize
the validity of these procedures. Thus, BACEN has considerable free-
dom to act within the boundaries of law without being subject to lawsuits
or to annulment of its decisions and acts.
BACEN also has an adequately designed governance structure. The
president and nine other members comprising a multi-member commis-
sion guarantee a continuous decision-making process and therefore avoid
the influence of a single individual. Although such items are subject to
the approval of the CMN, BACEN also has autonomy to elaborate its
internal rules and accounting procedures.
e. Budgetary or Financial Autonomy
Revenues of BACEN derive from the following: (1) financial transac-
tions and other investments of BACEN's resources; (2) foreign exchange
transactions, purchase and sale of gold, and any other transactions in for-
eign currency; and (3) other occasional revenues, including penalties and
interest charged upon default.1 81 In general terms, BACEN enjoys finan-
cial autonomy because its revenues are not derived from government
grants or certain budgetary determinations.
The constraints placed upon BACEN with revenues and financial re-
sources arise because of the relationship between BACEN and the Na-
tional Treasury. As set forth by Decree-Law No. 2,376 of November 25,
1987, the profits of BACEN must be transferred to the National Treasury.
Relevant literature argues that the transfer of profits to the Treasury is a
consequence of the monopoly of issuing currency granted to the entity,
and therefore, the transfer is recommended and acceptable.182
Finally, it must be noted that Law No. 4,595/64 subjects BACEN's
budget to the approval of the CMN. At the same time that this provision
may constitute a useful tool for guaranteeing accountability, it creates a
path for undue political influence in the institution.
f. Accountability Arrangements
The Brazilian legal system has a variety of accountability arrangements
in place that guarantee that the CMN, and especially BACEN, are subject
179. See supra Part III.C.A.3.
180. See supra Part II.C.2.c.
181. Law No. 4,595/64, art. 16 [Lei No. 4,595/64] (Braz.).
182. See SADDI, supra note 148, at 224. BACEN also finances the Treasury through the
purchase of Treasury Bonds, as allowed by article 164 of the Federal Constitution
of 1988.
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to different kinds of control. To begin with, Brazil adopts the principle of
separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judiciary
branches under article 2 of the Federal Constitution; each Power exer-
cises control over the others pursuant to the checks-and-balances doc-
trine.1 83 Acts of the Federal Administration, which include actions by the
CMN and BACEN, are subject to the review and control of the legislative
and judiciary branches.
For example, the two houses of the Brazilian Congress, the Senate and
the Chamber of Deputies, may institute parliamentary inquiry commis-
sions (comissdes parlamentares de inqugrito) with powers of investiga-
tion.184 As demonstrated below, such commissions have recently
represented an important legislative control over the acts of the monetary
authorities.
Furthermore, pursuant to article 70 of the Federal Constitution:
Control of accounts, finances, budget, operations and property of the
Union and of the agencies of the direct and indirect administration,
as to the lawfulness, legitimacy, economic efficiency, application of
subsidies and waiver of revenues, shall be exercised by the National
Congress, by means of external control and the internal control sys-
tem of each Power. 185
The external control by the Congress is carried out through the Federal
Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da Unido), which shall, among
other things, "evaluate the accounts of the administrators and other per-
sons responsible for public monies, assets and values of the direct and
indirect administration." 18
In addition, article 5, item XXXV, of the Federal Constitution sets
forth that the "law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a right from
the consideration of the Judicial Power." Inserted among the fundamen-
tal rights of the Brazilian Constitution, this principle places the judiciary
as a controller of last resort of unlawful acts of the legislative and execu-
tive powers.
Finally, BACEN, as an autarquia, is subject to the control of the Trea-
sury Ministry. Although autarquias enjoy autonomy with respect to their
revenues and assets, they are subject to the supervision of the applicable
Ministry of State. 187 According to C.A.B. Mello, this control consists of
verifying that the autarquias are fulfilling the goals stated by the law that
determined its incorporation and harmonizing the entities with the global
administration of the state.' 88
In sum, the Brazilian legal system provides an efficient accountability
framework. There is a consensus that both BACEN and CMN lack more
183. BRAZ. CONST. art. 2.
184. Id. art. 58, § 3.
185. Id. art. 70.
186. Id. art. 71, § 2.
187. Decree-Law No. 200/67, art. 19 [Decreto-Lei No. 200/67, art. 19] (Braz.).
188. MELLO, supra note 46, at 149.
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instruments of control by the general public, such as the public consulta-
tions and public meetings conducted by the Brazilian independent agen-
cies. Nevertheless, the recent decades witnessed certain initiatives of
BACEN that enhanced the disclosure of its activities to the general pub-
lic, increasing its accountability towards society.
g. Conclusions on Institutional RSI
It is possible to conclude that the Brazilian monetary authorities lack
institutional RSI. The presence of two government officials in the CMN
undermine any possibilities of regulatory independence in the organ re-
sponsible for enacting banking regulation. In addition, the CMN is still in
control of certain areas of BACEN and sets the limits for its supervisory
activities.
As an autarquia, BACEN presents an institutional framework that pro-
motes RSI. In fact, BACEN has a considerable degree of discretion in
the performance of the supervisory activities. However, because the gov-
ernors can be dismissed at the discretion of the president, the low amount
of the governors' salaries, and the short restrictive period after the expi-
ration of the mandates of governors, a scenario is generated in which reg-
ulatory capture and political influence are likely to occur.
Despite this unfavorable conclusion regarding institutional RSI, there
is a consensus that during the recent years and especially after the imple-
mentation of the Real Plan, the Brazilian government has demonstrated a
material commitment to RSI of monetary authorities. As demonstrated
below, this fact and other factors advocate the case for the implementa-
tion of institutional RSI in Brazilian monetary authorities.
5. The Real Plan, CMN and BACEN - Assessment of Material RSI
a. Preliminary Considerations
As set forth above, there is a consensus that within the administration
of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso BACEN was granted the power
to act as if it was independent, although not formally.189
In fact, since its creation in 1964, BACEN has not had independence
(except for a brief period during the Castelo Branco administration from
1964 to 1967), and has experienced different types of political and indus-
try interference. 190
In addition to clear political influence, different forms of regulatory
capture by the industry could be observed during the existence of
BACEN. In particular, until the implementation of the Real Plan, differ-
ent sorts of "moral hazard" situations existed. As mentioned above, the
function of central banks as lenders of last resort creates a perverse form
of industry capture, as bank owners are likely to engage in riskier activi-
189. See SOLA LOURDES ET AL., BANCO CENTRAL: AUJTORIDADE POLfTICA E
DEMOCRATIZACAO-UM EOUILIBRIO DELICADO 128 (2002).
190. See Part II.A.2.b.
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ties and count on the bailout or other rescue packages provided by mone-
tary authorities.
During the eighties, Brazil experimented a dispersion of monetary au-
thority in light of the process of politic decentralization carried out after
the end of the military regimes when the powers of state governors were
increased. State governors pressured for a decentralization of fiscal re-
sources and used state banks for the purposes of issuing quasi-currencies,
challenging the authority of BACEN. Quasi-currency was created upon
the issuance of state bonds and the granting of direct loans to state
governments. 191
History also demonstrates that every time a state bank faced financial
difficulties, the bank received a rescue package from BACEN, and the
monetary authority "relaxed" some of the conditions for the granting of
such programs. 192 The rescue package granted during the eighties,
namely Credit Support Program (Programa de Apoio Crediticio - PAC)
and Financial and Economic Recovery Program (Programa de Recupera-
CJo Econ6mica e Financeira - Prorefl, conditioned the financial bailout
on the adoption of several measures of deficit reduction and re-capitaliza-
tion by the banks. Many of these conditions were not observed by state
banks, but nevertheless, BACEN granted the aid packages. The extreme
situation could be observed through Decree-Law No. 2,321 of February
25, 1987, which created the special intervention mechanism in financial
institutions and the Special Temporary Management Regime (Regime de
Administra do Especial Tempordria - Raet). Although this legal measure
allowed BACEN to directly intervene in the management of state banks
and to conduct the liquidation of such institutions, these banks were re-
turned to the management of their shareholders after much of the costs
of the "broken" banks were borne by BACEN itself. In a very inappro-
priate manner, BACEN was not only financing broken state financial in-
stitutions, but also financing the public debt of Brazilian states and state
companies. 193
Industry influence was also present in the private sector. Although
moral hazard situations could not be specifically observed, there was a
general belief that certain banks were "too big to fail" and would there-
fore receive assistance from the monetary authority in case of need. 194
As demonstrated below, the implementation of the Real Plan and the
consequent economic stabilization allowed BACEN to regain political
power and establish a factual independence from political and industry
interests.
191. LOURDES ET AL., supra note 189, at 137-39.
192. See id. at 169.
193. Id. at 179.
194. Id. at 177.
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b. The Real Plan and Factual Independence of BACEN
Up to the implementation of the Real Plan, the Brazilian economy was
mainly characterized by hyperinflation. The inflation scenario was
favorable to state and private banks that managed to control their fiscal
deficits with inflationary financing, a technique consisting of granting
long term financing to the public and placing liabilities in short-term de-
posits or bonds. Between 1990 and 1993, the banking sector generated
inflationary revenues amounting to four percent of the GDP.19 5
The Real Plan emerged in 1994 from the process of economic stabiliza-
tion and liberalization in Brazil. Still in the administration of President
Fernando Collor de Mello after 1990, Brazil was gradually experiencing
certain measures of economic liberalization, including the removal of re-
strictions on capital flows, export barriers, and privatization. In view of
the hyperinflation environment after the eighties, the main purpose of the
plan was to reduce inflation rates to stabilize the economy. The plan
included the creation of a new currency, the Real, that would be
anchored to the U.S. dollar. A clear objective of pegging the Real to the
U.S. dollar was to attack the fiscal component of inflation by subjecting
the issuance of new money to the increase of the external reserves. 196
With economic stability arising from the Real Plan, the Executive
gained bargaining power over state governors, and the authority of
BACEN was reaffirmed. The end of high inflation weakened the finances
of state governments, and in turn, they became more dependent on the
federal government. 197 This situation was guaranteed by certain legisla-
tive measures, such as the restriction of the capacity of state banks to
grant loans to their shareholders1 98 and the enactment of laws establish-
ing the liability of managers of public companies. 199
In light of this scenario, BACEN increased its independence from in-
dustry and other political interests. This was observed in the disciplinary
measures taken by BACEN after the implementation of the Real Plan.
BACEN intervened successfully in Banespa (Bank of the State of Sdo
Paulo) and in Banerj (Bank of the State of Rio de Janeiro) on December
30, 1994. Interventions also were conducted in the Bank of the States of
Alagoas (January 23, 1995), Mato Grosso (February 6, 1995), and
Rond6nia (February 20, 1995).
Furthermore, the Incentive Program for the Reduction of the State
Public Sector in the Banking Activity (Programa de Incentivo d Redudo
do Setor Pdblico Estadual na Atividade Bancdria - Proes), a new, stricter
rescue package targeting state banks, was created. Pursuant to Provi-
195. Id. at 174.
196. Law No. 9,069 of June 26, 1995 [Lei No. 9,069 de 26 de junho de 1995] (Braz.).
197. LOURDES ET AL., supra note 189, at 141.
198. CMN (Conselho Monetdrio Nacional) [National Monetary Council] Res. No. 1,718
of May 29, 1990 (Braz.).
199. CRIMINAL CODE [C.P.] -Law No. 8,429 of June 2, 1992 [Lei No. 8,429 de 2 de
junho de 19921 (Braz.).
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sional Measure No. 1,514 of August 7, 1996, to obtain a full refinancing of
their state debts, state governors should agree with one of the following
measures in connection with their respective state banks: (1) privatiza-
tion; (2) liquidation; or (3) transformation into a state development
agency. If state governors wished to keep the control of their state banks,
only fifty percent of the state debt would be refinanced. Due to the grav-
ity of the banking crisis upon the stabilization of the currency, this was
not a feasible alternative.
Successful interventions also occurred in the private sector, including
the intervention in Banco Nacional, Banco Bamerindus - purchased by
HSBC, and Banco Econ6mico - purchased by Banco Excel and ulti-
mately acquired by the Spanish Bank Bilbao Viscaya. 200 The creation of
the Program for the Restructuring and Strengthening of the National Fi-
nancial System (Programa de Est(mulo d Reestrutura do e ao Fortaleci-
mento do Sistema Financeiro Nacional - Proer) also represented an
improvement in the factual independence of BACEN from the industry's
interests. 20 1 The difference between Proer and previous rescue programs
was that Proer allowed the incorporation of insolvent financial institu-
tions by healthy banks pursuant to the determination of BACEN.
The increasing number of interventions in public and private institu-
tions was followed by the implementation of several legislative and regu-
latory measures aimed at increasing the discipline within Brazilian
financial system and preventing banking crises. Such measures included:
1) the joint liability of controlling shareholders of financial institutions,
upon the enactment of Provisional Measure No. 1,182 of November 11,
1995 (currently Law No. 9,447 of March 14, 1997); 2) mechanisms to pre-
vent money laundering (Law No. 9,613 of March 3, 1998, as amended); 3)
a deposit insurance fund (Fundo Garantidor de Crddito - FGC), pursuant
to Resolution No. 2,212 of November 16, 1995; 4) the implementation of
internationally accepted principles of banking regulation and supervision,
such as methods of classification of credits, internal controls, and opera-
tional risks (CMN Resolutions No. 2,682 of December 22, 1999 and 2554
of September 29, 1998); and 5) restrictions for the use of liquidity credit
lines from BACEN and emergency loans (Resolution No. 2,685 of Janu-
ary 16, 2000).
Finally, it must be noted that the current composition of the CMN is a
result of the implementation of the Real Plan. Originally, the CMN was
composed of the following members: Treasury Ministry; the president of
Banco do Brasil S.A.; the president of Brazilian Development Bank
200. See LOURDES ET AL., supra note 189, at 189. From the implementation of the Real
Plan in 1994 to 1997, forty-three banks were submitted to intervention or liquida-
tion, being eighty percent from the private sector. Due to an increase in the partic-
ipation of foreign financial institutions and stricter disciplinary measures, a
reduction of twenty percent in the number of financial institutions in Brazil could
be observed between 1993 and 1999.
201. Provisional Measure (Medida Provisdria) No. 1,179 of Nov. 11, 1995 (Braz.); CMN
Res. No. 2,208 of Nov. 3, 1995 (Braz.).
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(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento EconOmico - BNDES); and six
members appointed by the President of Brazil and approved by the Sen-
ate. Such change reduced the number of industry representatives in the
main normative body of banking regulation.
In sum, although the statutory independence of BACEN was not as-
sured by legislative delegation, Brazilian monetary authorities enjoyed a
considerable and increasing degree of independence during the last dec-
ade, especially during the Cardoso administrations. From an initial situa-
tion of strong political influence from federal and state governments and
industry capture, the country experienced a true evolution in terms of
banking regulation and supervision. The data above demonstrates that
BACEN has acted in a much more pervasive way with respect to banking
supervision, acting against the interests of industry and state governors.
This result can be explained by the fact that the election of President
Cardoso in 1994 was highly based on the successful implementation of the
economic stabilization plan. The continuity of the economic stabilization
plan was also a crucial factor for his re-election in 1998. Also, during this
time there was a considerable change in the preferences of the Brazilian
population and in the motivations of the institutions of the country, which
got used to and were eager for financial and monetary stability. The
questionable financial package granted by BACEN to the banks Marka
and Fonte Cindam after the devaluation of the Real in 1999 resulted in a
strong reaction from the public and a thorough scrutiny of the members
of CMN and directors of BACEN by the Congress. This is evidence of
the generalized commitment to financial and monetary stability, as well
as evidence of the use and implementation of the accountability mecha-
nisms available under the Brazilian legal system.
Therefore, recent years have demonstrated a very strong commitment
by the federal government towards monetary and financial stability. 20 2
The material independence of the monetary authorities and the imple-
mentation of sound banking regulation and supervision were essential in-
struments to the pursuit of such values.
This section ends with an interesting paradox: at the same time that
Brazilian monetary authorities do not enjoy RSI under the current insti-
tutional framework, there is a strong commitment by the government to-
wards RSI, as reflected in the banking regulation adopted (which pursues
sound banking and international standards of banking regulation) and the
supervision conducted. The next section presents the case for institu-
tional RSI for Brazilian monetary authorities, as well as for an adequate
regulatory design in connection therewith.
202. See Jorge M. Guira, Preventing and Containing International Financial Crisis: The
Case of Brazil, 7 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 481, 481-506 (2001); J. W. Anderson, Jr.,
Banking Regulation in Brazil: A Legal Analysis of Responses to Exchange Market
Pressure, essay presented in the International Banking Law course, Spring 2003, at
the University of Warwick for analyses of Brazilian responses to financial and cur-
rency crises and commitment of the authorities towards monetary stability.
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6. A Case for Institutional RSI in Brazil
a. A Scenario Supporting a Case
Because of the institutional and factual features of the Brazilian regu-
latory and supervisory design, this work argues that there is a case for the
implementation of institutional or statutory RSI in Brazilian monetary
authorities. Although political influences and industry capture were
highly present during the history of Brazilian monetary authorities, the
implementation of the Real Plan changed the political, social, and eco-
nomical background of Brazil. This opened the path for the implementa-
tion of RSI. The economic stability allowed BACEN to increase its
disciplinary measures with financial institutions and enhanced its bargain-
ing power towards state banks and governors. The commitment of the
past administration to economic stability resulted in a "de facto" regula-
tory and supervisory independence of monetary authorities because of
the pursuit of sound banking regulation and supervision in accordance
with worldwide-accepted principles.
Similarly, the last decade was characterized by the evolution of social
preferences and thinking towards financial stability, sound banking prac-
tices and rules, and adequate banking supervision. The impact on public
opinion of the scandals generated by the doubtful rescue packages
granted by BACEN after the devaluation of the Real in 1999 evidences
this fact. The Brazilian Congress reacted to this situation by triggering
available accountability mechanisms ("parliamentary inquiry commis-
sions"). 20 3 This is further evidence of the trend in Brazilian society to-
wards RSI. Currently, the Brazilian society sustains a generalized belief
in financial stability and international credibility, and financial crises like
neighboring Argentina's are not a feasible option.
Finally, uncertainties of monetary policy and banking supervision by
the current administration must be highlighted. As mentioned above, in
May 2003, the press indicated clear strategic divergences between mem-
bers of the federal administration and BACEN personnel, especially in
connection with inflation control and reduction of interest rates. 20 4 Such
divergences culminated in the dismissal of the monetary policy director of
BACEN.205 Considering the current political scenario, it is not clear
whether the informal commitment to RSI achieved during the Cardoso
administration will be maintained.
In view of the proposed reforms to the Brazilian financial system, Bra-
zil has the opportunity to include institutional RSI of monetary authori-
ties in its legal framework. This inclusion would assure that the
203. BRAZ. CONST. art. 58, § 3.
204. See Felipe Freire, Folha Online, Meirelles Rebate Cn'tica de Alencar e Expie Racha
No Governo (May 22, 2003), available at http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/folha/din
heiro/ult9lu67586.shtml.
205. See Sandra Manfrini, Folha Online, Diretor do BC Pede Demissdo um Dia Ap6s
Decisdo Sobre Juros (May 22, 2003), available at http://wwwl.folha.uol.com.br/
folha/dinheiro/ult91u67570.shtml.
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governmental commitment to RSI is maintained and regulatory capture
and time-inconsistency problems are formally addressed. Such a measure
would enhance the country's credibility within the international scenario
and strengthen Brazilian institutions, therefore enhancing the pursuit of
economic growth. The following section addresses the proposal for in-
cluding institutional RSI within the Brazilian legal system.
b. A Proposal for RSI in Brazil
As set forth above, the approval of Amendment No. 40 to the Federal
Constitution allows the possibility for the enactment of different laws for
purposes of regulating the National Financial System. The only other rel-
evant legislative initiative concerning the same topic is Project of Law
No. 317 for 2003, elaborated by the Senate. This project contemplates
important elements of CBI such as statutory independence, a defined
mandate for the president and directors of BACEN, clear procedures for
the dismissal of governors of BACEN, and defined goals of monetary pol-
icy. While it contemplates the figure of the mega-regulator discussed in
section 3.4 above, it does not address RSI. Banking regulation is still
under the competence of the CMN, and the composition of the organ is
not fundamentally changed by the project.
Because the project does not contemplate RSI, it is herein proposed
that the regulatory and supervisory functions are removed from CMN
and BACEN, respectively, and granted to a different body organized as
an independent agency under Brazilian law (autarquia especial). This
proposal is backed by existing literature defending the separation of the
regulatory and supervisory functions from central banks or authorities in
charge of the formulation and implementation of monetary policy.20 6
In addition, the legal framework of the independent agencies guaran-
tee RSI by addressing the requirements outlined in Chapter 3. First,
those agencies are created with specific goals to reach.207 In the same
way access to telecommunication and electricity services can be a statu-
tory goal, financial stability and sound banking regulation and supervi-
sion can be established as mandatory targets in such a legal regime. In
addition, Brazilian independent agencies are granted (1) absence of hier-
archic subordination; (2) independence or autonomy in the administra-
tive, financial, patrimonial, technical, and human resources management
fields; and (3) a fix mandate and stability of its officers. Financial (or
budgetary) and decisional autonomy are therefore intrinsic to the legal
regime of such agencies.
206. See Part III.C.4.
207. See Law No. 9,427 of Dec. 26, 1996 [Lei No. 9,427 de 26 de dezembro de 1996]
(Braz.) (which created the National Agency of Electric Energy (Agincia Nacional
de Energia Elitrica - ANEEL)); Law No. 9,472 of July 16, 1997 [Lei No. 9,472 de
16 de julho de 19971 (Braz.) (which created the National Agency of Telecommuni-
cation (Ag~ncia Nacional de TelecomunicaC6es - ANA TEL)).
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Most personnel concerns are also addressed by the legal regime of the
independent agencies. Independent agencies are managed by a collegiate
organ. One of the members of the collegiate organ is the president.20 8
The concern of preventing the influence of a single individual is therefore
addressed. Furthermore, suitability concerns are addressed in article 5 of
Law No. 9,986/00, by requiring that the members of the collegiate organ
must be Brazilians of good reputation with superior education and a high
level of expertise in the field of functions that they will perform. Mem-
bers of the collegiate organ are appointed by the President of Brazil, and
approved by the Senate (as demonstrated above, the approval by the sen-
ate represents a useful accountability tool, and prevents undue political
influence from the executive).
Article 6 of Law No. 9,986/00 provides a fixed mandate for directors of
independent agencies to be set forth in the law of creation of a given
agency. Pursuant to article 9 of Law No. 9,986/00, the mandate of direc-
tors of independent agencies can only be terminated upon renouncement,
judicial determination, or through a disciplinary administrative proceed-
ing. This clear dismissal criterion is a useful instrument for the establish-
ment of RSI and addresses some of the concerns discussed in regard to
the dismissal procedures of governors of BACEN.209 Article 8 of Law
No. 9,986/00 also contemplates the four-month restrictive period for di-
rectors of independent agencies. After the expiration of their mandate,
directors are not allowed to work in any type of function within the public
service or in any private companies within the sector regulated and super-
vised by the independent agency. Salaries are also limited in the same
manner as the salaries of BACEN governors. In this respect, the same
considerations on the restrictive period and salaries of governors of
BACEN apply. 210
The concentration of banking regulation and supervision in an inde-
pendent agency would also represent an improvement of accountability
mechanisms. In addition to the existing accountability framework, the
framework of independent agencies contemplates instruments of public
participation in the decision-making process of such bodies. These may be
in the form of public consultations, public meetings, and formal accusa-
tions by the public and interested parties.
The present proposal purports to address a specific reasoning behind
optimal regulatory structures. As described above, optimal regulatory
and supervisory designs must be drawn pursuant to the specific character-
istics of a given country, including political structures and traditions, the
size of the country, and the financial sector. In addition, drastic measures
and institutional changes may be burdensome for any given country and
may even cause considerable losses for the regulatory regime, including
208. Law No. 9,986 of July 18, 2000, art. 4 [Lei No. 9,986 de 18 de julho de 2000, art. 4]
(Braz.).
209. See Part III.A.4.b.
210. See Part III.A.4.c.
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the loss of regulatory culture and memory. The use of a figure available
in the Brazilian legal system would address these concerns because the
regulatory, political, and economic traditions of Brazil would be
respected.
Finally, some specific qualifications and requirements are necessary for
purposes of coordinating the independent regulatory agency of banking
regulation and supervision with the other monetary authorities of Brazil.
Although the independent agency would be free from the existing politi-
cal influence in the CMN and consequently in BACEN (in this case, there
is no "piggyback" of RSI in relation to CBI), a degree of interaction be-
tween the agency and the authorities that elaborate on monetary policy,
exercise the functions of lender of last resort, and guarantee liquidity in
the payment system must be guaranteed.
It is therefore proposed that the president or another director of the
independent agency occupy a seat, even without a right to vote in the
CMN and in BACEN. With this arrangement, an adequate exchange of
information could occur among the authorities, a reasonable degree of
consistency between monetary policy and banking supervision could be
achieved, and the function of the lender of last resort could be properly
performed.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the RSI of monetary authorities is herein supported and
the implementation of the corresponding institutional arrangement is jus-
tified for purposes of avoiding regulatory capture and time inconsistency
problems. In addition, the framework of RSI is an important factor for a
country's financial stability, and such an institutional arrangement may
directly contribute to a country's credibility and consequent economic
growth.
As to the proposed case study, Brazilian monetary authorities do not
enjoy institutional RSI. Nevertheless, the case for the implementation of
RSI in Brazilian monetary authorities is advocated, taking into considera-
tion the material commitment of the previous and current administrations
of the country towards RSI and generalized social support of financial
stability within the country. The separation of regulatory and supervisory
functions from the CMN and BACEN into an independent agency is de-
fended as the adequate institutional arrangement for this purpose.
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